This maritime focus is not without reason. As the Quad Statement in May stated, there has been growing concern over China’s activities within the South and East China Sea as it increases its militarisation and territorial claims in those waters.
The Indo-Pacific is one of the most important maritime zones in the world. It is home to critical sea lanes through which an estimated one-third of global trade passes, connecting East Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, and beyond.
For both India and Australia, keeping these waters stable, open and free from any single power’s dominance is an economic necessity as well as a shared strategic interest.
Outcomes of the second Defence Ministers’ Dialogue
The joint statement after the meeting covered three broad topics.
First was “Maritime Domain Awareness”. Both countries have agreed to make progress on their collaborative maritime domain awareness efforts and explore opportunities to enhance undersea domain awareness. It would monitor anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact security, safety, the economy, or the marine environment.
Second, the ministers welcomed their strategic convergence in ensuring a stable Indo-Pacific through the Quad’s Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Collaboration (IPMSC), an initiative aimed at strengthening maritime coordination and regional stability, initially implemented in the Indian Ocean Region, as stated in the joint statement.
Beyond maritime collaboration, the meeting also highlighted the importance of both countries enhancing their collective strength. They welcomed joint military exercises, intelligence sharing, and cooperation in defence and technology research, as stated in the joint statement.
As a result, both countries are trying to institutionalise their partnership in defence and maritime security to strengthen their presence in the Indo-Pacific region and remain in close coordination on supply chain security and trade routes.
China in the broader Indo-Pacific context
As the Quad Statement earlier in May stated, China has been increasing its militarisation and territorial claims in the South and East China Sea.
The dispute centers on overlapping claims over the Spratly and Paracel Islands and the surrounding waters. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, coastal states are entitled to a 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone, or EEZ, where they control natural resources.
According to a BBC report, China’s claim goes beyond this legal framework. Through what is known as the Nine-Dash Line, China asserts historical rights over a major part of the South China Sea. This U-shaped line appears on Chinese maps but does not align with the EEZ system established under international law. It overlaps with the maritime zones of Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei.
In the assertion of these claims made by China, the international community has shown concern over a series of well-documented advances by the Chinese military that has resulted in the blockage of civilian supply boats, and the damage done through ramming of these vessels with coastal guard vessels.
In response, the Quad officially showed “strong opposition to any destabilizing or unilateral actions including by force or coercion that threaten peace and stability in the region.”
In 2025, according to a BBC report, Australia expressed their worries and publicly condemned the surge in the unsafe jet maneuvers and release of flares against Australian Patrol jets in South China Sea. From 2023, Australia has been accusing China of “unsafe and unprofessional” maneuvers against the Australian navy and Air Force. Moreover, The Foreign Affairs Ministry also issued a media release where they have also rejected the territorial claims made by China over the South China sea and have asked both China and Philippines to abide by international law to resolve the conflict.
The growing India-Australia partnership is, in large part, a response to China’s expanding influence across the Indo-Pacific. For Australia, this partnership is both economic and strategic. China accounts for roughly 30% of Australia’s exports as its largest trading partner, which proved costly in 2020. According to South China Morning Post, Beijing imposed tariffs on Australian wine, barley, cotton, copper, coal, sugar and lobsters following Canberra’s call for an independent inquiry into COVID-19’s origins. India, with its large and rapidly growing economy and demand for Australian coal, LNG, and critical minerals, offers a credible path toward reducing that exposure.
Strategically, the intentions are equally clear. China has secured port access around the Indian subcontinent — from Djibouti on the Horn of Africa to Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, and Kyaukpyu in Myanmar. This so-called String of Pearls places Chinese deployment along the very sea lanes that connect Australia’s western approaches to global markets. India, as the dominant power in the Indian Ocean by both geography and naval capability, is the natural partner for Australia in monitoring and countering that presence.
Together, through intelligence sharing, joint maritime surveillance, and coordinated military exercises, the two countries are building something beyond diplomatic alignment. The Quad gives them a forum to raise concerns about Chinese behaviour without acting unilaterally which is significant for a power like Australia that cannot afford to confront Beijing alone.
The Defence Ministers’ Dialogue signals that New Delhi and Canberra have moved past the question of whether to cooperate and are now focused on building the systems, habits, and trust that make cooperation operational rather than merely aspirational.
The author is an intern with The Indian Express
US and Philippine Navy ships in the South China Sea. Wikimedia Commons 
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