How China and the US first established diplomatic ties 45 years ago, why Taiwan became a sticking point

First, why did US-China relations need ‘normalisation’?

After the rise and fall of various dynasties in China’s modern history, it came under Japanese attack and occupation in the early 20th century. Japan was defeated in World War 2 in 1945. However, China then witnessed a civil war where two political groups competed for control – the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the nationalist party or the Kuomintang (KMT).

The Mao-led CPC emerged victorious in 1949, and the Chiang Kai-shek-led KMT fled to the island of Taiwan. Thus, the People’s Republic of China was set up on the mainland and the Republic of China was restricted to the island of Taiwan. Both claimed to be the ‘real’ China.

In this period, the capitalist US and the socialist USSR were engaged in the Cold War, both superpowers claiming ideological and economic superiority. While Russia backed the People’s Republic of China, the US pledged its support to Taiwan. This was in line with the US strategy of ‘containment’ (or the Truman Doctrine given by President Harry S Truman), aimed at limiting the spread of Communism.

How the US and China sought to establish formal relations

As the decades went by, alignments shifted. After a split between the allies USSR and China, beginning in the early 1960s, the US believed that China could be an ally against the USSR. China, too, was open to looking for new partners.

“Chinese Communists: Short range—no change. Long range—we do not want 800,000,000 living in angry isolation. We want contact … [want] China—cooperative member of international community and member of Pacific community,” Nixon would write in a note in his very first two days in office in 1969.

He asked his National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger to attempt reaching out to China. In 1969, an American diplomat reported, “The Pakistanis are working in the belief that President Nixon told President Yahya [Pakistan’s President Yahya Khan] that the US wished to seek an accommodation with Communist China and would appreciate the Pakistani’s passing this word to [Chinese Premier] Zhou Enlai and using their influence to promote this.”

The US also reached out to Romania and Poland – both communist countries. Zhou Enlai had told the Romanians that the key issue with the US was the American “occupation of Taiwan” and invited them to discuss it in Beijing.

Taiwan, the bone of contention

This culminated in Kissinger secretly visiting China while officially on a trip to Pakistan in 1971. Next year, Nixon made an official visit and became the first US President to do so. The trip would also lead to the establishment of Liaison Offices in Beijing and Washington, which functioned as informal diplomatic posts.

Henry Kissinger and Chairman Mao, with Zhou Enlai behind them in Beijing, early 1970s. (Via Wikimedia Commons)

The 1972 Shanghai Communique was signed to acknowledge the desire for closer ties. It also referred to Taiwan, saying “The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.”

Still, normalisation would only happen in 1979. One reason for the delay was the changes in political leadership on both sides. In 1974, Nixon resigned following the Watergate scandal (which broke out in 1972).

Nixon’s successor Gerald Ford also visited China in 1975, but Mao was quite ill at the time. He passed away the following year, triggering a period of confusion with the loss of a towering authority figure in China. Deng Xiaoping would go on to succeed him, having earlier been purged by Mao for his positive outlook on liberalising and opening up the economy – seen as anti-communist.

The need for normalisation triumphs

Deng is known for ushering in a series of landmark economic reforms in China in 1978. His outlook was different to leaders like Mao, who wanted to maintain the status quo. He said in a speech, “In the past, we did not absorb advanced knowledge from foreign countries. The developed countries attach importance to scientific achievements… The advanced result of scientific study is the result of human labour. Why not absorb these results? What is shameful about absorbing them?”

The book ‘Normalization of US-China Relations: An International History’ (2005) says that for the US, closer relations with China were also seen as a kind of damage control for the Vietnam War loss in 1975. “Washington would have lost a battle but, with China on its side, would be seen to be winning the war against its major communist adversary,” it says.

According to the book, China’s interest in promoting development through foreign trade and investment joined with its national security interests at this juncture. Deng once said, “If President Carter would like to visit China, we heartily welcome him. But it would not be reciprocal, that means the Chinese leaders would not go to Washington because there is an ‘embassy’ of the KMT.”

In the intervening period, Deng also discussed his dissatisfaction with the US with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the premier of Pakistan. On Taiwan, the “Japan formula” was referred to – Japan’s decision to establish diplomatic relations with China while retaining only nongovernmental, unofficial exchanges with Taiwan.

Jimmy Carter later recalled, “Taiwan definitely was the biggest challenge we faced throughout the negotiations. We recognized that for the People’s Republic of China, its relationship with Taiwan was considered a domestic issue. Nevertheless, the American people had had an extensive, close, and friendly association with the Taiwanese people. It was important that this be continued through nongovernmental means.”

Following the normalisation of ties, the US Embassy in Taipei, Taiwan, was shifted to Beijing. Deng also visited the US, becoming the first Chinese President to do so.

But in the same year, the US Congress approved the Taiwan Relations Act, which allowed informal relations between the US and Taiwan and for US arms sales to the island. It says “The United States shall provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character and shall maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan.”

“Ultimately, Beijing and Washington succeeded in ending thirty years of diplomatic estrangement by focusing not on ideology but on interests. Mutual accommodation served mutual security… despite the obstacles and the frequent disagreements, strong leadership in both countries led to success,” the book says.