Why Turkey is seeking to end the long-simmering conflict with Kurds now

These policies led to Kurdish resistance and several uprisings during the 20th century, including the Sheikh Said and Dersim rebellions. The current armed conflict began in 1984, when the PKK, founded by Abdullah Öcalan in 1978, launched a guerrilla campaign against the Turkish state. So why is Ankara pushing for peace now, and what does each side stand to gain?

Key proposals in draft law

Turkey’s renewed urgency

Kadir Yildirim, a non resident fellow at the Baker Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, in his article, The New Peace Initiative and Kurdish Perspective, attributes the renewed urgency to electoral politics. Yildirim notes that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s AKP and its coalition partner, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), seek Kurdish political backing—specifically from the pro-Kurdish DEM Party—to secure parliamentary support for constitutional amendments or other electoral pathways for another presidential term.

Besides politics, decades of counter-insurgency operations, defence spending, and regional instability in southeastern Anatolia have cost the Turkish economy billions of dollars. Resolving the conflict is expected to bring economic relief amid Turkey’s broader macroeconomic pressures, according to an ETH Zurich report. An agreement could also reduce vulnerabilities across Turkey’s southern borders in Iraq and Syria, where Kurdish armed groups operate.

The conflict has claimed over 40,000 lives since 1984. According to the London-based Campaign Against Arms Trade, the casualties include Turkish military and security personnel, PKK fighters, and thousands of Kurdish and Turkish civilians. Reports by the International Crisis Group and Amnesty International suggest that between 350,000 and 1 million people were internally displaced, primarily during the forced evacuation of thousands of villages in southeastern Turkey during the 1990s and the urban battles of 2015–2016. The International Crisis Group has recorded approximately 6,000 deaths since 2016, including PKK militants, Turkish security forces and civilians.

Kurdish response

According to Yildirim, Kurdish society and political representatives display a complex mix of strong aspirations for peace and deep institutional scepticism. He notes a strong desire for a peaceful resolution among Kurdish civilians, who have borne much of the cost of military conflict, displacement, and economic neglect in the southeast. Yildirim also argues that imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan’s call for disarmament, and the group’s willingness to disarm, suggest a greater inclination towards democratic politics and constitutional rights rather than armed struggle.

At the same time, Kurdish activists remain cautious due to past failures—including the 2013–2015 peace process and the current status of pro-Kurdish politicians. They emphasise that, without guarantees of democratic reform and cultural and linguistic rights, lasting peace will remain difficult, Yildirim notes.

Peace amid West Asia crisis

The ongoing conflict in West Asia, involving Israel, Iran, the United States and regional proxies, appears to have added urgency to Ankara’s calculations. Turkey fears that escalating proxy warfare in Iraq and Syria could create power vacuums, enabling external actors to weaponise autonomous Kurdish armed groups against Turkish interests.

A peace agreement could therefore help insulate Turkey from the spillover of armed conflict in the region.

Turkey had hoped to advance this process in early 2025. However, with the escalation of regional conflict, key state institutions tasked with executing the peace process, specifically the Turkish Armed Forces, the Interior Ministry, and the National Intelligence Organisation (MİT), shifted their priorities from domestic peace negotiations to immediate national defence.

Kurds in Iran, Iraq and Syria

While the Turkish-PKK agreement directly addresses the insurgency in Turkey and northern Iraq, its impact on Kurdish communities elsewhere in the region is less direct.

In Iraqi Kurdistan (KRG), peace is likely to improve conditions by ending decades of Turkish military operations against PKK strongholds in Qandil and Dohuk. The disarmament of the PKK could also more closely align the interests of the ruling Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) in Erbil and Ankara.

In Rojhelat, or Iranian Kurdistan, the demilitarisation of the PKK is expected to reduce cross-border armed activity along the Iran-Iraq-Turkey tri-border region, shifting the Kurdish struggle in Iran more towards political and civil rights movements rather than armed insurgency.

Meanwhile, in Rojava, or northeastern Syria, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF/YPG) share ideological roots with the PKK. A successful disarmament framework in Turkey could create pathways for political normalisation and local autonomy agreements in northeastern Syria.

2013–2015 process versus current framework

While the 2013–2015 “Solution Process” relied mainly on informal, executive-driven negotiations conducted by intelligence officials and informal delegations without a legal framework, the current initiative has been submitted to parliament as legislation. By embedding surrender procedures, probation terms, and oversight mechanisms into law, supervised by a multi-ministerial executive committee and a parliamentary commission, the state aims to give the peace process a legal foundation that its predecessor lacked.

Moreover, during the 2013–2015 process, Turkish nationalist actors, particularly Devlet Bahçeli’s MHP, fiercely opposed negotiations with the PKK. Today, the MHP is part of Erdoğan’s governing coalition and backs the initiative, giving the process nationalist support it previously lacked.

The regional balance has changed too. While the earlier process coincided with the expansion of autonomous Kurdish governance in Rojava, Turkey now has a substantial military presence in northern Iraq and Syria.