How Trump pushed the US into Israel’s bid for ‘regime change’ in Iran

Netanyahu’s ‘hard-sell’

According to the NYT piece, Netanyahu made a “hard sell” with a presentation at the White House situation room before Trump and his key advisors — without Vice President JD Vance, who was in Azerbaijan at that time — on February 11, suggesting that Iran was ripe for regime change and expressing the belief that a joint US-Israeli mission could finally bring an end to the Islamic Republic.

The Israelis also played a brief video that included a montage of potential new leaders who could take over the country if the hard-line government fell, and that included the last Shah’s son, Reza Pahlavi, according to NYT. It is another matter Pahlavi has been completely ignored in the last five weeks.

The Israeli pitch was that “Iran’s ballistic missile program could be destroyed in a few weeks and the regime would be so weakened that it could not choke off the Strait of Hormuz, and the likelihood that Iran would land blows against U.S. interests in neighboring countries was assessed as minimal”.

Besides, intelligence from Mossad, the Israeli spy agency, indicated that street protests inside Iran would begin again and — with the impetus of Mossad helping to foment riots and rebellion — an intense bombing campaign could foster the conditions for the Iranian opposition to overthrow the regime. The Israelis also raised the prospect of Iranian Kurdish fighters crossing the border from Iraq to open a ground front in the northwest, further stretching the regime’s forces and accelerating its collapse, the NYT report said.

Team Trump’s assessment

The next day, when US intelligence officials analysed and shared their assessment with key US officials who were part of Trump’s inner circle, there was a realistic assessment since they had deep expertise in US military capabilities, and they knew the Iranian system and its players inside out.

They had broken down Netanyahu’s presentation into four parts. First was decapitation — killing Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Second was crippling Iran’s capacity to project power and threaten its neighbours. Third was a popular uprising inside Iran. And fourth was regime change, with a secular leader installed to govern the country.

“The U.S. officials assessed that the first two objectives were achievable with American intelligence and military power. They assessed that the third and fourth parts of Mr. Netanyahu’s pitch, which included the possibility of the Kurds mounting a ground invasion of Iran, were detached from reality,” the report said.

When Trump joined the meeting, Central Intelligence Agency (the US’s foreign intelligence service) director John Ratcliffe briefed him on the assessment and described the Israeli PM’s regime change scenarios as “farcical”. At that point, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said, “In other words, it’s bullshit.”

Ratcliffe added that given the unpredictability of events in any conflict, regime change could happen, but it should not be considered an achievable objective, the NYT report said. Several others jumped in, including Vance (just back from Azerbaijan), who also expressed strong scepticism about the prospect of regime change.

Trump then turned to the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dan Caine, and asked him what he thought. Caine replied: “Sir, this is, in my experience, standard operating procedure for the Israelis. They oversell, and their plans are not always well-developed. They know they need us, and that’s why they’re hard-selling.”

Trump quickly weighed the assessment. Regime change, he said, would be “their problem”. It was unclear whether he was referring to the Israelis or the Iranian people.

But the bottom line was that his decision on whether to go to war against Iran would not hinge on whether parts 3 and 4 of Netanyahu’s presentation were achievable. Trump appeared to remain very interested in accomplishing parts 1 and 2: killing Khamenei and Iran’s top leaders, and dismantling the Iranian military.

And it shows how, in the end, even the more sceptical members of Trump’s War Cabinet — with the stark exception of Vance, the figure inside the White House most opposed to a full-scale war — deferred to the president’s instincts, including his abundant confidence that the war would be quick and decisive.

Proponents and sceptics

Distrusted as Netanyahu was by many of Trump’s advisers, the former’s view of the situation was far closer to Trump’s opinion than the anti-interventionists on Trump’s team or in the broader “America First” movement liked to admit. This had been true for many years.

Back in office for a second term, Trump’s confidence in the US military’s abilities had only grown and he was especially emboldened by the spectacular commando raid to capture the Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro from his compound on January 3 this year. No American lives were lost in the operation, yet more evidence to the president of the unmatched prowess of US forces.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. Photo: AP/Mark Schiefelbein

According to the NYT report, US Secretary of Defense (or War), Pete Hegseth, was the biggest proponent of a military campaign against Iran within the Cabinet.

Rubio indicated to colleagues that he was “much more ambivalent”. He did not believe the Iranians would agree to a negotiated deal, but his preference was to continue a campaign of maximum pressure rather than start a full-scale war. He, however, did not try to talk Trump out of the operation, and after the war began he delivered the administration’s justification with full conviction.

Trump’s Chief of Staff, Susie Wiles, had concerns about what a new conflict overseas could entail, but she did not tend to weigh in hard on military matters in larger meetings; rather, she encouraged advisers to share their views and concerns with Trump in those settings. Wiles would exert influence on many other issues, but in the room with Trump and the generals, she sat back. Those close to her said she did not view it as her role to share her concerns with Trump on a military decision in front of others. And she believed that the expertise of advisers like General Caine, Ratcliffe, and Rubio was more significant for the president to hear.

Wiles had told colleagues that she worried about the US being dragged into another war in the Middle East. An attack on Iran carried with it the potential to set off soaring gas prices months before midterm elections that could help decide whether the final two years of Trump’s second term would be years of accomplishment or subpoenas from House Democrats. But in the end, Wiles was on board with the operation.

Vance’s stance

The NYT report said that nobody in Trump’s inner circle was more worried about the prospect of war with Iran, or did more to try to stop it, than VP Vance.

“The vice president thought a regime-change war with Iran would be a disaster. His preference was for no strikes at all. But knowing that Mr. Trump was likely to intervene in some fashion, he tried to steer toward more limited action. Later, when it seemed certain that the president was set on a large-scale campaign, Mr. Vance argued that he should do so with overwhelming force, in the hope of achieving his objectives quickly,” it said.

US Vice President JD Vance. Photo: AP/Jonathan Ernst/Pool

In front of his colleagues, Vance warned Trump that a war against Iran could cause regional chaos and untold numbers of casualties. It could also break apart Trump’s political coalition and would be seen as a betrayal by many voters who had bought into the promise of no new wars.

NYT reported that Tucker Carlson, the commentator who had emerged as another prominent sceptic of intervention on the right, had come to the Oval Office several times over the previous year to warn Trump that a war with Iran would destroy his presidency. Two weeks before the war began, Trump, who had known Carlson for years, tried to reassure him over the phone. “I know you’re worried about it, but it’s going to be OK,” Trump said. Carlson asked how he knew. “Because it always is,” Trump replied.

In the final days of February, the Americans and the Israelis found that the Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei would be meeting above ground with other top officials of the regime, in broad daylight and wide open for an air attack. “It was a fleeting chance to strike at the heart of Iran’s leadership, the kind of target that might not present itself again,” it said.

It said that Trump had effectively made up his mind weeks earlier, several of his advisers said. But he had not yet decided exactly when. Now, Netanyahu urged him to move fast.

That same week, Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, and US Envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, called from Geneva after the latest talks with Iranian officials. Over three rounds of negotiations in Oman and Switzerland, the two had tested Iran’s willingness to make a deal. They laid out the picture for Trump. They could probably negotiate something, but it would take months, they said.

“If Mr. Trump was asking whether they could look him in the eye and tell him they could solve the problem, it was going to take a lot to get there, Mr. Kushner told him, because the Iranians were playing games,” the report said.

Operation Epic Fury

The NYT said that on February 26, a final Situation Room meeting got underway. Hegseth and Caine ran through the sequencing of the attacks.

Vance, whose disagreement with the whole premise was well established, addressed Trump: You know I think this is a bad idea, but if you want to do it, I’ll support you.

According to the report, Wiles told Trump that if he felt he needed to proceed for America’s national security, then he should go ahead. Meanwhile, Ratcliffe offered no opinion on whether to proceed, but he discussed the “stunning” new intelligence that the Iranian leadership was about to gather in the ayatollah’s compound in Tehran.

Rubio told Trump: If our goal is regime change or an uprising, we shouldn’t do it; but if the goal is to destroy Iran’s missile program, that’s a goal we can achieve.

Everyone deferred to Trump’s instincts. They had seen him make bold decisions, take on unfathomable risks, and somehow come out on top. No one would impede him now.

“I think we need to do it,” Trump told the room. He said they had to make sure Iran could not have a nuclear weapon, and they had to ensure that Iran could not just shoot missiles at Israel or throughout the region.

The NYT reported that Caine told Trump that he had some time — he did not need to give the go-ahead until 4 pm the following day. On the afternoon of February 27, 22 minutes before General Caine’s deadline, Trump was aboard Air Force One when he sent the following order: “Operation Epic Fury is approved. No aborts. Good luck.”