Expert Explains | Why does SCO matter to India? It’s not just soft power

What were India’s objectives going into the SCO summit, and have they been achieved?

India’s objective in becoming an SCO member was basically to reach out to Central Asian countries, because that is a region that we consider to be a part of our extended neighbourhood. It is a region with which we have cultural, historical, and civilisational ties, and had dynamic and robust ties even till Soviet times in the 1990s.

These countries are also extremely rich in natural resources: mineral resources, oil, gas, critical minerals, uranium. For our own energy needs, we need to reach out to them and have good relations. And SCO would provide us a platform in which we could connect with them at the highest level and advance and promote our relations with them.

Secondly, in terms of the whole issue of terrorism — security, stability, and peace — whether it is the double standards as far as dealing with terrorism, or cross-border terrorism is concerned. So, those are issues that are very critical for us — the Bishkek Declaration mentions these elements in so many words.

Then, the issue of connectivity: we have de jure access to Tajikistan through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), but we don’t have de facto connect because this region is unfortunately currently occupied by Pakistan. So, we’ve been trying to go through Iran, through Chabahar, through the INSTC (International North-South Transport Corridor, a 7,200-km freight corridor comprising ship, rail, and road routes between India, Iran, Azerbaijan, Russia, Central Asia, and Europe).

This focus on connectivity is present not only in the Declaration but also during PM Modi’s discussions with Mr (Vladimir) Putin and Mr (Masoud) Pezeshkian as well as with Shavkat Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan, when the PM was in Tashkent before coming to Bishkek.

Then, this meeting, our participation in the meetings: as the world is getting fractured into different segments — East and West, North and South — this platform provides us an opportunity to demonstrate our role as a bridge-builder. We are equally at ease with the countries of the East, so to say, Russia, and also with Iran… (there has been) normalisation of our relations with China. In terms of optics, it serves a purpose and demonstrates we have options.

PM Narendra Modi meets Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping during the 26th SCO Summit in Bishkek on September 1, 2026. Photo: Reuters/ANI Video Grab

You would remember when some viral images emerged last year from the SCO summit meeting in Tianjin when Mr Putin and Mr Modi were travelling together in one car. Mr Trump had then commented that “India has been lost to deep, dark China”. Here also, the sense of bonhomie, camaraderie between these three leaders (Modi, Putin, and Xi Jinping) — the message of India’s strategic autonomy is delivered very clearly.

Lastly, in terms of positively contributing to the discussions and activities, whether it is in the civilisational dialogue that will take place, also on the Buddhist heritage, traditional medicines, Young Scientists Forum, Young Authors Forum — all these issues where countries can work together, we have been focusing on that.

So, India had a number of objectives and most of them have been satisfactorily realised. But all of this is work in progress, since the world is undergoing rapid changes.

PM Modi spoke about terrorism being a “grave challenge for humanity” and spoke about the need to send a “strong message” to countries that use it “as an instrument of state policy”, even as Pakistan PM Shehbaz Sharif listened. Given Pakistan will host the 2027 SCO summit and that India has previously used this forum to send a message to Pakistan, will PM Modi attend next year?

One year is a long time. Things can change, and are likely to change, even as far as bilateral ties with Pakistan are concerned. Not necessarily that they get worse. They could be stable at this adversarial level that we are at this particular moment, or there might be a slight uptick. One can never really say. It’s too early really to comment upon that. The government will have to take all pros and cons into consideration.

According to the current state of relations between the two countries, it is very unlikely that he will take the step of going there, but definitely this first part that you mentioned about India — pinpointing about double standards, cross-border terrorism, etc., — that is a consistent position that India has taken, whether Shehbaz Sharif has been present or not.

This will continue not only on the SCO fora but also in the BRICS fora. You will see in another 10 days or so (India hosts the 2026 BRICS Summit on September 12-13, 2026) that definitely it is an issue that will come up and India will have equally scathing remarks. But this becomes more relevant right now in the SCO context because Shehbaz Sharif was also present in the same hall.

The “Bishkek Declaration” has condemned the US and Israel’s war on Iran. PM Modi also met Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian during the summit. Considering that India has attempted to forge a close relationship with both the US and Israel, will India being a signatory to this declaration affect its strategic and diplomatic ties with the two?

India has good relations with the US and Israel, but they are not exclusive relations with these two countries. When we are maintaining strategic autonomy, it means we cooperate and collaborate on the basis of our interests, keeping the principles of the UN Charter, etc., in mind.

So, we have good relations with Israel. But we also have good relations with the Palestinian Authority. We do give them support. They have an embassy. We recognised them long ago.

With Iran, we have, again, civilisational and historical ties. Now, it is very important because of access to energy through the Strait of Hormuz and even the welfare of our seafarers. Also, the safety and security of 10 million Indians in the Middle East.

If you look at the SCO summit declaration in 2025 in Tianjin, we had categorically mentioned the names of Israel and the US: that they have launched attacks against Iran (during the 12-day war in June 2025). Here, in the Bishkek Declaration, it has been moderated to an extent that the names of those two countries have not been mentioned — the declaration just condemns the attacks on Iran.

Here, the attacks have been going on for more than six months. The nature of aggression has been much greater, and yet the formulation has been more moderate. So, in that sense, I don’t think Israel or the US are going to be particularly upset.

Also, all the four Central Asian countries (who are SCO members — Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan) have good relations with the US. All of them follow what they call the multi-vector foreign policy, so they are also very mindful of their ties with the US. If India wants to moderate the language, it has other partners who also would like to work with it.

For India, the SCO has historically never been a comfortable strategic forum given China and Russia’s dominance, besides Pakistan’s presence. How has India attempted to establish its place at the table, and what more can it do?

Definitely, it is an organisation that is dominated by China and, to an extent, less so by Russia. But the pivot around which SCO revolves are the four Central Asian countries.

India has a large number of strengths. Number one, our historical, traditional, and civilisational ties with Central Asia. So, our soft power has been very strong. The challenge is to convert it to real hard power in terms of better economic ties, more projects, greater connectivity, and innovation.

India’s economy is growing and we have a number of strengths even in the area of innovation and technology: fintech, Digital Public Infrastructure, pharmaceuticals, critical minerals, uranium, etc.

Over the last few years, particularly since 2022 when the Russia-Ukraine conflict started, Central Asian countries also wish to lessen their dependence on China and Russia. They want to diversify because they have followed a multi-vector foreign policy, at least the two big ones — Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and they want to have more options. India ideally fits the bill.

That is why PM Modi’s visit to Uzbekistan was so very successful, in which even UPI was adopted in Uzbekistan. There was a long-term arrangement for supply of uranium. The strategic partnership arrangement was upgraded to a comprehensive strategic partnership. A Coordination Council was established. All the ongoing dialogue mechanisms will be upgraded to the ministerial level.

Now, it would be fair to say that proof of the pudding is in the eating. But there is determination on both sides. So, definitely, India is finding its feet and spreading its influence.

Also, since it became a member (in 2017), India has been trying to make English a medium of communication in the SCO. Earlier, it was only Russian and Mandarin; at this meeting, it was agreed that English would be an SCO language.

The Iran war has highlighted the importance of the Central Asian republics in terms of global connectivity. Is there an opportunity for India to engage more with these countries given the current geopolitical instability in West Asia?

It’s important to recognise that all the Central Asian countries are landlocked countries. In fact, Uzbekistan is a doubly landlocked country. They do not have any access to the warm waters of the sea — the Caspian Sea does not have access to any maritime shipping routes.

So, connectivity is very important for them. In that context, the INSTC and Chabahar are really a lifeline for these countries.

Of course, China’s Belt and Road Initiative is playing an important role. India does not support it, because it does not respect our sovereignty and territorial integrity as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor goes through PoK.

But otherwise, the INSTC and Chabahar are very important — even for Afghanistan. That definitely does provide a huge impetus to our own access to that region, which we term as our extended neighbourhood. Current circumstances might not allow us to make much progress in the near term. But India will continue to pursue this with our Central Asian partners.