Myanmar’s most recent political crisis began with the February 1, 2021, coup by armed forces under Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. The military takeover has exacerbated Myanmar’s foundational instability, abruptly reversing a decade of nascent democratic reforms in the country.
It has also plunged the country into a grave humanitarian crisis with the human toll of conflict escalating to catastrophic levels. The International Court of Justice is at present deliberating on a charge of genocide brought against Myanmar by The Gambia.
The UN estimates that nearly half the population currently lives at or below the poverty line. An estimated 15 million people are expected to face acute food insecurity. The massive internal and regional displacement crisis triggered by the coup has led to 3.2 million people forced to flee their homes. The junta’s policies have also bred a climate of fear and increased security controls. Myanmar’s Cybersecurity Law enacted on January 1, 2025 criminalises a wide range of online activity and rolls back civil and political liberties.
What are the concerns surrounding the recent elections?
Min Aung Hlaing’s rhetorical pledge of a transition towards a “disciplined democracy” notwithstanding, serious concerns regarding process, participation, and credibility have dogged Myanmar’s entire electoral cycle. The lopsided election results underscore deep-seated systemic exclusions that made the USDP’s landslide victory possible (739 out of 1,025 national and provincial seats).
Under post-coup laws enacted in 2022 and 2023, the junta-appointed Union Election Commission (UEC) dissolved more than 40 opposition parties, including the National League for Democracy (NLD) that had swept the 2020 polls. Dozens of smaller parties such as the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy and the Arakan National Party were either banned or forced to withdraw.
The electoral process was also discredited due to widespread territorial disenfranchisement, with the UEC openly acknowledging that polling could not be held in 56-67 townships. Millions were unable to vote, especially in conflict-affected regions in the west and north, including Rakhine, Shan and Kachin.
If Min Aung Hlaing assumes leadership of a civilian government, is his hold over the military likely to weaken?
As the civil war drags on, managing internal power and military cohesion will be a fundamental priority for Min Aung Hlaing. Post-coup military weaknesses and battlefield setbacks have fed this unease and fuelled growing dissatisfaction within the senior ranks.
Myanmar’s armed forces have faced major offensives by resistance forces that have weakened operational capacity and morale within the ranks. A key turning point was Operation 1027 launched in 2023 by the Three Brotherhood Alliance of ethnic armed groups and resistance forces, which exposed deep structural weaknesses in the military.
These challenges notwithstanding, the political and institutional power structure in Myanmar remains fundamentally military-centric. Military dominance is deeply institutionalised within the 2008 constitution, which reserves 25 per cent of parliamentary seats for the armed forces and gives them control over key ministries such as Defence, Home Affairs and Border Affairs.
Min Aung Hlaing has also been making institutional arrangements that further bind military power to the civilian administration. Early last week, he signed a new law establishing the Union Consultative Council to be headed by him, which will function as an extra-constitutional “super-body” to exercise ultimate oversight. A carrot-and-stick policy has also seen frequent reshuffles aimed at maintaining control and consolidating military loyalty. A major reshuffle in 2024 saw 30 senior military officers being removed and demoted from their posts.
What is likely to be high up on the new government’s agenda?
For Myanmar, the transition from a military to a nominally civilian rule will be a critical and precarious political transition. In an ironic attempt to manage a crisis of its own making, the military now seeks to “restore stability” to a nation gravely destabilised by its own actions.
Ensuring that this transition is a tightly calibrated process will clearly be key to maintaining its institutional influence and dominance. Towards this end, extensive personnel changes are being made across the civilian bureaucracy, systematically purging, replacing and filling key administrative bodies with loyalists. Over 300 military officers were reassigned to civilian positions within ministries between early 2023 and 2024.
The military’s overriding focus on immediate survival has also seen a rapid expansion of surveillance infrastructure and a tightening of oversight across all digital networks. Internet shutdowns, VPN bans, mobile communication blackouts have been used extensively to curb dissent, constrain political mobilisation, and limit information flows.
Internationally, continued diplomatic isolation will also be a major concern, with sanctions by Western governments largely still in place. Regionally, ASEAN has refused to certify the elections, continues to bar Myanmar from attending bloc summits, and endorses the Five-Point Consensus that calls for a cessation of violence. There have, however, been some pockets of issue-based linkages with India, China, and Malaysia, focussing on humanitarian assistance, aid and development projects.
What does India need to watch out for?
Myanmar’s crisis presents India with a set of challenges that will defy easy or immediate solutions. These will be multidimensional in nature, cutting across diplomacy, border governance, internal security, and the wider regional security calculus.
Clearly, there is a lot at stake for India as Myanmar’s continued political instability, endemic violence, and institutional fragility create spillover pressures for its internal security. These present India with complex intertwined challenges: from managing refugee flows to controlling cross-border arms trafficking and smuggling. The spillover has brought nearly 31,000 refugees to Mizoram as of February 2026 with UN figures recording a nearly 500 per cent increase in the seizures of synthetic drugs reported over the past five years.
This instability will be felt most acutely along their shared 1,643-km porous border, heightening cross-border volatility with the risk of key development and connectivity projects such as the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project and the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway being left in limbo.
India’s strategic calculations will have to also factor in new ground realities that point to the junta’s sharply eroded territorial control. Reports claim that rebel forces and ethnic militias now exercise effective control of about 42 per cent of Myanmar’s territory. The ongoing crisis in Myanmar has also increased the operational space for cross-border insurgent activity along the India-Myanmar border, with the NSCN-IM reportedly consolidating positions in Sagaing region and offering cross-border logistical support to Valley-based groups.
This shifting political landscape underscores a sobering reality for India. The Myanmar military is evidently not a viable net security provider and clearly lacks the wherewithal to safeguard India’s strategic, economic and security interests.
India’s humanitarian assistance including earthquake response relief under Operation Brahma in 2025 offers a natural entry point to support the people who have borne the brunt of Myanmar’s multidimensional conflict.
Nimmi Kurian is a Professor at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi.
Myanmar government officials during a ceremony to mark Myanmar's 79th anniversary of Union Day in Naypyitaw on February 12, 2026. Photo: AP/Aung Shine Oo 
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