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Expert Explains | Why India needs a clear ‘Arctic narrative’

While science continues to underpin India’s presence in the Arctic, the scope must extend beyond exploration. Although India released its Arctic Policy in 2022, a recent parliamentary committee report highlights a concerning gap.

Ny-Ålesund in Norway's Svalbard archipelago, where India's Himadri research station is located. India remains one of only two developing countries with a permanent scientific presence in the Arctic. Photo: Wikimedia Commons

7 min readNew DelhiAug 10, 2026 09:08 AM IST First published on: Aug 9, 2026 at 07:00 PM IST

Written by Captain Anurag Bisen (retired)

The recently released report by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on External Affairs, titled “India’s Role and Presence in the Arctic and Antarctic Regions”, comes close on the heels of India’s Arctic Policy issued in 2022. It is seminal for more than one reason: while it covers both polar regions, its most significant implications concern India’s future engagement with the Arctic, a region whose strategic importance is growing at a far faster pace than India’s capacity to engage with it.

Such engagement has long been viewed through the lens of scientific research. While science continues to underpin our presence, the Arctic now extends beyond exploration. It is evolving into a hub where climate change and geopolitics converge.

The report consistently asks a pertinent question: what is India’s narrative on the Arctic?

India has stronger credentials in the Arctic than is often acknowledged. Few realise that India, as part of the British Dominion, was among the original 14 signatories of the 1920 Svalbard Treaty. The treaty entitles an Indian to visit Svalbard — a Norwegian archipelago located between mainland Norway and the North Pole — without a visa and to engage in commercial ventures.

More than a century later, India remains one of only two developing countries with a permanent scientific presence in the region, through the Himadri research station in Ny-Ålesund, Svalbard. The report, however, highlights a concerning gap between India’s ambitions and its capabilities.

The Indian Arctic narrative

The first pillar of such a narrative must be climate security. India’s dependence on the monsoon remains profound. Agriculture still accounts for roughly 18% of its gross domestic product and supports more than half of its population. Nearly 70% of India’s annual rainfall comes from the southwest monsoon.

Scientific studies increasingly point to an Arctic-Indian monsoon teleconnection. Rapid Arctic warming and declining sea ice alter atmospheric circulation patterns that influence monsoon behaviour across South Asia. What happens in the Arctic does not stay there; it affects rainfall patterns, agricultural productivity, food security, and economic growth in India.

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Second, sea-level rise: The Arctic is a major contributor to global sea-level rise. If current trends continue, entire low-lying island states — such as the Maldives — face existential threats. Large parts of Bangladesh and significant stretches of India’s coastline could experience recurrent flooding and displacement. By some estimates, more than 250 million people living in vulnerable coastal regions of South Asia could be affected by mid-century.

For India, this is not merely an environmental issue but one of national security. Large-scale climate-induced migration from neighbouring regions could create unprecedented humanitarian, social, and security challenges.

Geopolitical importance

The Arctic’s geopolitical significance is equally compelling. Two of India’s closest strategic partners, the US and Russia, are Arctic nations. China, India’s principal long-term adversary, has invested heavily in Arctic infrastructure, research, and shipping despite being an extra-regional state.

The Arctic is increasingly emerging as a battleground for major powers, with maritime access, energy security, and critical mineral supply chains intersecting.

The Himadri research station in Svalbard, Norway. (Wikimedia Commons)

India also maintains friendly relations with the other six Arctic nations. While the recent India-Nordic Summit has enhanced cooperation with Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Iceland, relations with Canada have seen notable improvement.

Considering few countries enjoy such widespread goodwill within the Arctic region, the question is whether India is prepared to engage at a scale commensurate with its interests.

A Polar Ambassador

The committee’s recommendation regarding a dedicated Polar Ambassador also deserves special mention. In terms of engagement, India’s present challenge is structural: responsibility for Arctic affairs is fragmented across multiple divisions within the Ministry of External Affairs. The eight Arctic states and Arctic Council-related matters are handled by four different territorial and functional divisions, making a coherent whole-of-government Arctic engagement difficult.

Also read | How Arctic thaw aggravates climate concerns, ignites geopolitical competition

All Arctic states have dedicated Arctic ambassadors, and several observer states do too. Singapore, a tropical island nation closer to the Equator than India, has a Special Envoy for Arctic Affairs. Many European observer states maintain similar arrangements.

India, despite having an Arctic policy, still lacks a dedicated senior official responsible for Arctic affairs. A Polar Ambassador would coordinate inter-ministerial efforts, engage Arctic governments and institutions, and help articulate a consistent Indian narrative on Arctic governance.

Polar Research Vessel

Without an ice-class research vessel, India’s scientific footprint in the Arctic remains largely confined to Svalbard. Access to the wider Arctic Ocean depends on collaboration with foreign partners and on the availability of chartered vessels.

The limitations of chartering are obvious. Expedition schedules remain dependent on foreign availability. Research priorities are constrained by contractual arrangements. Long-term observational programmes become difficult to sustain.

The committee rightly notes that a dedicated Polar Research Vessel (PRV) is essential for India to undertake meaningful pan-Arctic research.

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Unfortunately, despite the PRV being sanctioned by the Union Cabinet in 2014, it remains on the drawing board. The government’s current plan envisages delivery of an indigenous Polar Research Vessel only towards the end of this decade.

In the meantime, China offers an instructive example. Rather than waiting to build indigenous capability from scratch, Beijing acquired a second-hand icebreaker from Ukraine, commissioned it as Xuelong (Snow Dragon), and used it as the foundation for its polar programme. Today, China operates several polar-capable vessels and is the second country after Russia to be building a nuclear icebreaker.

India should consider a similar interim solution.

Shortfall in funding

Perhaps the report’s most striking revelation concerns funding. India spent just Rs 17.53 crore on Arctic activities in 2024-25: less than one-tenth of its expenditure on Antarctica and less than the cost of building a kilometre of a flyover. For a region that affects sea-level rise along India’s 11,098-km coastline and is a climate and geopolitical hotspot, the figure appears apologetic.

The mismatch between interests and investments is another recurring theme. The Committee effectively asks the government: if the Arctic is important enough to warrant a national policy, a dedicated parliamentary study, and repeated diplomatic engagement with Arctic states, why does India’s budgetary commitment suggest otherwise?

India needs a coherent Arctic narrative. The Arctic Policy of 2022 provided the framework. The Parliamentary Committee has now identified the gaps. The next step is to translate policy into capability.

India can no longer afford to view the Arctic as a distant frozen wilderness. It is increasingly becoming a region central to India’s future, and our policies, institutions, and investments must reflect that reality.

The author is a veteran submariner. He is senior fellow, Vivekananda International Foundation, and senior advisor, Arctic Program, Institute for Governance & Sustainable Development.