Two eminent scholars of international relations, Amitabh Mattoo and Joseph S Nye, weigh in on how to read the rise of Xi Jinping’s China — for today and the future — from the perspectives of India and the US
But linear extrapolation from past events is always dangerous, and the trend line may change. China is in demographic decline. Its labour force peaked in 2015, and the population profile shows fewer productive younger people having to support older generations.
While China has made impressive progress on some technologies that can replace labour, its total factor productivity (labour and capital) has been declining, and it is far from clear that tightening party and state control of the private sector will help solve this problem.
The ExpertsAmitabh Mattoo is Professor at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, and Honorary Professorial Fellow at the University of Melbourne. Joseph S. NYE JR. is University Distinguished Service Professor, Emeritus, and former Dean of John F Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. They wrote separate journal articles on 'How Not To Deal With A Rising China' from a South Asian and American perspective respectively in a 'How Not To' guide to international relations in the September issue of International Affairs journal. This article appeared this week as a post on the International Affairs Blog.
MATTOO: One of the biggest misconceptions about China is the belief that Beijing was ‘socialised’ into accepting the rules and the norms of a post-Cold War international system dominated by the West. There was also a myth, perpetuated by Sinologists for centuries, that Chinese strategic culture was inward-looking and not prone to expansionism. We are witnessing the end of these misconceptions.
Rather than behaving like a status quo power, China is acting like any other rising power that seeks to challenge the prevailing order, through the use of force if necessary.
China’s belligerence is heightened by its repressive system of government and its totalitarian leader, Xi Jinping, probably the most powerful since Mao. The Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s “24-character strategy” of maintaining a low profile and biding time is now forgotten!
There is no evidence that China’s strategic culture is moderating its offensive-realist policies across the region. China is deploying all the instruments propounded by the ancient Indian philosopher and political strategist Kautilya (with Chinese characteristics): saam, daam, dand, bhed (persuade or purchase or punish or exploit a weakness) to dominate its neighbourhood and beyond.
The Indo-Pacific
What dynamics will shape the future international politics in the Indo-Pacific?
MATTOO: There will be an interplay of four factors that will shape the future of the Indo-Pacific.
First is the direction of China’s rise over the next decade. On present evidence, Beijing’s ambitions are to be the ‘hegemonic’ power in the Indo-Pacific. In this scenario, China will be increasingly belligerent, willing to use its “wolf warrior diplomacy” to challenge the “rules-based order” put into place by the West and weaponise its multilateral presence.
If, however, China’s economy slows, as it has recently, and it faces increasing dissent, China could become more cautious and risk averse in its foreign policy. The latter is less likely.
Second, much depends on how committed the United States is to the region, especially given its current weak leadership and its new focus on the European theatre in the wake of the war in Ukraine. If the promise of AUKUS and the Quad translates into reality, we may witness a stronger bulwark against Chinese designs than is the case today.
Third, countries like India — rising in power, status and influence — facing the brunt of Chinese revisionism, and the choices they make will also be a critical factor in the shaping of the future of the region.
Finally, unpredictable, high-impact Black Swan events could have an overarching impact on the region. A pandemic, environmental catastrophe or the use of a weapon of mass destruction could undermine traditional sources of power and security.
NYE: The rise of China has created a situation where most countries want to maintain economic access to its large market, but also do not want to be politically dominated by China. Thus, many countries want an American presence in the region for security purposes, but do not want to alienate China. India will soon become the world’s most populous country and is a growing economy. Japan, the third largest national economy, has a military alliance with the US.
In principle, this balance of power could be a formula for stability in the region but it could be disrupted by American withdrawal; a worsening of the India-China border conflict; a war over Taiwan; a North Korean nuclear event; or other low-probability but high-impact events.
Neighbours’ options
Are balancing against or cooperating with China the only options that exist for China’s neighbouring states?
MATTOO: While the western study of international relations focuses on balancing, cooperating or hedging, non-western IR offers other more nuanced perspectives. This is particularly true of civilisational states like India whose thinking on war, peace, order, justice and morality is captured in many of its classical texts.
For instance, Dharma is a key concept in Indian thinking on war and peace.
What, then, does Dharma mean strategically? First, Dharma means upholding the larger righteous interest, the welfare of humanity, in both its mundane and its transcendental sense.
Second, Dharma means action, not passivity — acting without material incentives, and without regard for the narrowly defined gains from that action. It means acting decisively while recognising that the fight to uphold Dharma will almost necessarily cause collateral damage both in terms of a strict adherence to principle, as well as in terms of violence.
Finally, the fight for Dharma requires acting independently, without attachment, without fear and without external pressure. Dharma can only be sustained through the doctrine of strategic autonomy. It brings into harmony flexibility in diplomacy (even duplicity when needed) and purposeful violence when required. True statecraft and strategic autonomy become inseparable, bringing about a fusion of thought and action for the higher purposes of statecraft.
In sum, Dharma offers a path beyond the choice of balancing or cooperation within a framework that combines national-interest, realpolitik and righteousness.
China and the US
How should policymakers understand the future relationship between the United States and China?
NYE: As I have argued, (‘How not to deal with a rising China: a US perspective’, International Affairs: Sept 6, 2022) policy-makers in both countries should avoid demonising each other and realise that the relationship is not like the Cold War. There is much more economic, social and ecological interdependence between the US and China than ever existed between the US and the Soviet Union.
Instead, policy-makers should see the relationship as a “cooperative rivalry” or “competitive coexistence” with equal attention to both parts of the description.
As former Australian prime minister Kevin Rudd has argued, the objective for great power competition between China and the US is not defeat or total victory over an existential threat, but a “managed competition” (The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict between the US and Xi Jinping’s China, Public Affairs, 2022).
If China changes for the better in the long term, that is simply an unexpected bonus for a strategy that aims for successful management of a great power relationship in a time of traditional as well as economic and ecological interdependence.
Chinese President Xi Jinping waves at an event to introduce new members of the Politburo Standing Committee at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Oct. 23, 2022. (AP Photo/Andy Wong, File) 
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