US Department of Defense report on China’s military: Arunachal as ‘core interest’, PLA improving capabilities

A Chinese defence spokesperson on Thursday expressed opposition to the report, saying it “misrepresented” China’s national defense policy and military development to mislead the international community.”

Another spokesperson commented on the references to India, stating, “China views and handles its relations with India from a strategic height and a long-term perspective,” and that the boundary question was a bilateral issue, which is currently “generally stable with smooth communication channels”. Here are the highlights, indicating how the United States government perceives the world’s second-largest military spender.

1. Taiwan, South China Sea as the Chinese military’s focus

According to the report, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which is the Chinese Communist Party’s military, has consistently improved its military capabilities. In particular, this is in pursuit of its “2027 goals, whereby the PLA must be able to achieve “strategic decisive victory” over Taiwan, “strategic counterbalance” against the United States… and “strategic deterrence and control” against other regional countries.”

“In other words, China expects to be able to fight and win a war on Taiwan by the end of 2027,” it added.

In the post-pandemic era, many in the US establishment believe that 2027 (marking a century of the PLA’s formation) will be the probable year of China’s attack on Taiwan to meet the stated goal of “unification”. However, the report also said that “As of 2024, China’s leaders probably… remain unsure of the PLA’s readiness to successfully seize Taiwan while countering U.S. involvement”. Thus, it may look for other, non-military methods to force Taiwan’s capitulation.

The report further detailed China’s claims in the South China Sea, including recent skirmishes with countries like the Philippines, despite a 2016 international tribunal rejecting China’s “nine-dash line” that it cites to claim a large part of the resource-rich region.

2. Arunachal, LAC, and China’s vision for itself

The report said, “China’s National Strategy is to achieve “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by 2049.” This narrative of national rejuvenation is often framed against China’s history of colonisation and exploitation by foreign powers.

In this context, China has defined three non-negotiable “core interests”: “1) the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) control, 2) promoting China’s economic development, and 3) defending and expanding China’s sovereignty and territorial claims.” Here, the report said the term now covers “Taiwan and China’s sovereignty claims amid territorial disputes in the South China Sea, the Senkaku Islands, and the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh.”

In another section on regional developments, it said, “In October 2024, Indian leadership announced an agreement with China to disengage from remaining standoff sites along the LAC two days before a meeting between President Xi and Indian Prime Minister Modi on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit.”

While noting that it marked the onset of deeper interactions and a normalisation process, it said, “China probably seeks to capitalize on decreased tension along the LAC to stabilize bilateral relations and prevent the deepening of U.S.-India ties; however, India probably remains skeptical of China’s actions and motives. Continued mutual distrust and other irritants almost certainly limit the bilateral relationship.”

3. US-China relations in Trump 2.0

The report said that “Under President Trump’s leadership, relations between the United States and China are stronger than they have been in many years, and the Department of War will support efforts to build on this progress. We will do so in part by opening a wider range of military-to-military communications with the PLA”.

However, it identified hurdles on China’s end. “China’s record of canceling defense and military engagements in response to perceived offenses or heightened tensions suggests that China views defense and military engagements as a tool to punish or reward the United States for its perceived behavior, instead of these engagements being inherently valuable to maintaining peace and stability.”

It asserted that while focusing on maintaining communications for de-escalation, “U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific are fundamental — but also scoped and reasonable. We do not seek to strangle, dominate, or humiliate China. Rather, as laid out in President Trump’s National Security Strategy, we seek only to deny the ability of any country in the Indo-Pacific to dominate us or our allies.”

4. China’s anti-corruption campaign

Significant space was devoted to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign, “including the firing of two PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) commanders, deputy commanders, Chief of Staff members; state-owned defense industry seniors; and a top PLARF engineer, all of which have involvement in nuclear weapons”. The campaign has covered both senior and junior officers in the civilian administration, and, increasingly, in the military.

Other prominent cases in the report included General Li Shangfu, previously appointed to the Central Military Commission (the top defence decision-making body) as the Minister of Defence. He was removed in October 2023, “probably because of corruption related to weapons procurement in his previous role as head of the CMC Equipment Development Dept.”

Among the more recent notable cases is the CMC’s second Vice Chairman, Gen He Weidong, also “presumed to be suspended due to corruption.”

These developments are “very likely creating reverberations within China’s nuclear forces and may be raising questions among leadership about force readiness,” the report said. The fact that senior rocket force officials were later replaced with those of the navy and the air force “probably reflect Xi’s preference for loyal outsiders capable of achieving national defense objectives and meeting critical modernization milestones.”

Overall, it said the ongoing anti-corruption campaign could have “short-term effects on readiness while potentially setting the stage for long-term PLA improvements overall,” and the PLA could ultimately “emerge as a more proficient fighting force in the future if it uses the current campaign to eliminate systemic issues enabling corruption”.

5. Tech capabilities of the PLA

Since the first full year of Xi Jinping’s term as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (2013), the report said, “China’s announced defense budget has nearly doubled.”

However, it added that analysts believe the Budget does not include China’s total defense spending. In 2024, it was “probably approximately $304-$377 billion, or 32-to-63% higher than Beijing’s announced budget of $231 billion.” For comparison, the US defence Budget for the fiscal year 2024 was $874 billion.

Defence spending by some Indo-Pacific states. (Report screengrab)

Further, “China continues to accelerate its development of military technology, including in military AI, biotechnology, and hypersonic missiles.” Examples included unmanned systems that supposedly use AI to assist with navigation and coordination with other such systems.

It noted other developments related to conventional weaponry, such as the sea trials of China’s third aircraft carrier, Fujian, commissioned in November this year. China is also attempting to develop a sixth-generation aircraft (which no country currently possesses) for various combat missions, including air-to-air and air-to-surface missions, as well as guiding uncrewed aircraft in combat missions.