Hamas has agreed to disarm. So why is Israel still refusing to leave Gaza?

So why is Israel resisting withdrawal, and could a change in its stance be expected in the near future? The answer has to do with Israel’s domestic political concerns, rebukes from its longstanding international ally, the US, and the limitations posed by the current state of the conflict.

Why has Hamas agreed to disarmament?

Trump, who also serves as the Chairman of the Board of Peace, has said that Hamas’s disarmament was a key part of the 15-point peace plan for Gaza.

Announced in July, the plan included provisions on returning Palestinian detainees and prisoners, and the creation of a temporary International Stabilisation Force (ISF) for Gaza’s internal security.

While Hamas’s disarmament was at that point seen as unlikely, its later announcement reflects the limited avenues for breakthrough as the conflict drags on, said Islam Alhalawany, Principal at London-based QFLA Advisory and a specialist in West Asian politics.

Since 2023, more than 73,000 Palestinians have been killed in Israel’s war in Gaza. “The military situation reached a deadlock. Israel cannot displace Palestinians further, and Hamas cannot deter Israeli incursions or address the humanitarian collapse after three years. Flexibility became rational,” Alhalawany told The Indian Express.

He also noted the role of mediators Egypt, Turkey and Qatar, who were thanked by Trump as well. “Hamas appears convinced – partly through pressure from Islamic mediators – that demonstrating compliance will help expose Israel’s rogue posture internationally. This is what is called ‘Wedge Strategy’, and here, it works by enhancing the split between Washington and Tel Aviv. Meanwhile, maintaining the ceasefire would allow a breathing space to the tiny, besieged enclave of Gaza.”

The divergence between American and Israeli leaders has been visible, even as larger strategic concerns mean the countries continue to publicly reiterate mutual support. Axios reported on August 14 that Trump called Netanyahu “his own worst enemy”, citing people who discussed the Israeli PM with him.

And why is Netanyahu intent on Hamas’s disarmament?

With about two months left for the Israeli legislative elections, Netanyahu faces many political challenges. These will be the first elections held since the October 7, 2023 Hamas attacks, with Netanyahu criticised for the security failure in its immediate aftermath.

Polls indicate a difficult road ahead. As Axios noted, Netanyahu’s current coalition — often termed the most right-wing government in Israeli history — could fall short not only of its current seat tally but also of the majority needed to form a government. However, if no coalition manages a majority, he will continue as caretaker PM for a few more months, until the next election is held.

For Netanyahu, this is significant because he has linked his personal standing with his prime ministerial role and the war on Gaza. In November 2025, he asked the country’s president to grant him a pardon from corruption charges, stating that the request would help unify the country at a time of momentous change, the AP reported at the time.

Alhalawany said that Hamas disarmament was a “natural ask” given his political concerns, but matters in providing a sense of his broader vision for the conflict as well.

“Israel’s two constituencies around the war are divided into two; one is concerned with Israel’s global image and fears of over-stretching Tel Aviv’s relationship with Washington, while the second is clearly inclined for a more assertive posture at all expense. Netanyahu chose the latter a long time ago, and his maximalist posture on every front shows he’s pursuing this strategy for political survival,” he said.

This is also reflected in rising attacks against Palestinians. Despite the October 2025 ceasefire, UN experts this month “condemned the sharp escalation of attacks against Palestinian civilians across the occupied Palestinian territory”. Settler violence — committed by Israeli “settlers” who live in territories captured by Israel in 1967, primarily the West Bank — has also risen this year. Far-right Israeli politicians like Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir have also supported settlers and called for intensifying attacks on Gaza.

Activists take down a metal structure in the shape of a Star of David from atop a Palestinian structuretin support of local landowners whose property is threatened with seizure by settlers in the West Bank. (AP Photo/Mahmoud Illean)

Add to this the sour sentiment among at least some Israelis over the US-Iran deal, which was seen as giving concessions to the Jewish state’s main adversary state in its neighbourhood.

Could both parties realistically adhere to these conditions?

American officials have been reported to view Israel’s public resistance to the plan as part of election rhetoric. But it poses clear limitations nonetheless.

Writing for the think tank European Council on Foreign Relations, Senior Policy Fellow Hugh Lovatt wrote that Board of Peace officials “now appear to be altering parts of the laboriously negotiated deal… to accommodate Israel’s hardline stance.” This includes first requiring Hamas to surrender its arms.

However, he added, “Such manoeuvring risks undermining Hamas support for the agreement… Given the near impossibility of removing every single Palestinian weapon, as many are held by families, clans, criminal networks and jihadi groups, Israel could argue indefinitely that the conditions for its withdrawal have not been met.”

Alhalawany said that “Neither side is genuinely committed to adherence. The ceasefire diplomacy is another form of war by other means, where Israel signals deterrence, and Hamas seeks to publicly embarrass Tel Aviv.”

Continued Israeli attacks in Gaza and in Lebanon will also have wider implications. As a whole, Alhalawany said, the region is more “strategically fragmented” than it used to be. In the shared interest of preventing full escalation, players like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Egypt are working to re-establish rules of engagement and redlines, he said.

And, as the case of the Strait of Hormuz showed, “Beneath the security layer, these states are navigating around trade chokepoints and beginning to localise industrial capacity. That reconfiguration will reshape the region’s economy for decades to come,” he added.