An expert explains: As the US moves Islamic State detainees out of Syria, understanding the surge of violence

Who are the Kurds, and why did the US back them in recent years?

The Kurds are one of the largest ethnic groups in the world, spread over Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria in West Asia. They also constitute a substantial diasporic population in Europe and elsewhere. The Kurdish language, with its various dialects, is a major unifying factor in their dispersion across countries.

In Syria, the Kurds form around 8.5 to 10% of the total population, and comprise an estimated 5% of the total Kurdish population. They faced various forms of discrimination — cultural, linguistic, economic and political — during the Ba’athist rule in Syria under both Hafiz al-Assad and his son Bashar al-Assad, who was deposed in December 2024.

In its ideology of asserting Arab nationalism, the Ba’athist regime considered the Kurdish demand for cultural and linguistic recognition and autonomy as a threat to a unified Syrian Arab political entity.

The Kurds in Syria’s northern and eastern regions asserted their autonomy during the Syrian civil war. It began after an uprising in March 2011, when many other countries of the Middle East and North Africa saw popular protests to end authoritarian and dynastic regimes — dubbed the “Arab Spring”.

The civil war lasted until the removal of Bashar al-Assad. The Kurds called their autonomous region “Rojava”, and their fighting forces included the People’s Protection Units (YPG) and Women’s Protection Units (YPJ).

Pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party, known as DEM, supporters shout slogans during a protest, in Istanbul, Turkey, Saturday, Jan. 24, 2026. (AP Photo/Francisco Seco)

Over time, the region developed with decentralised governing institutions and even steps to enshrine women’s equality. The nature of autonomy expanded and shifted — from Kurdish institutions, parties, forces and administration to a wider area comprising the Arabs and other ethnic groups in northern and eastern Syria. The current form of Kurdish-led multi-ethnic autonomous system is known as the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES).

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are the armed forces of this autonomous entity. Its primary force is the Kurdish YPG, but it also serves as a coalition of fighters from other ethnic groups. The United States substantially supported Kurdish autonomy during the fight against Islamic State forces in Syria and Iraq in the 2010s. It backed the SDF, which was integral in defeating the IS in Syria.

The IS was territorially defeated in 2019. What has now triggered the fight between the Kurds and the Syrian government, and why have the Kurds retreated?

The post-Assad transitional government of Syria has been attempting to bring various ethnic groups and military forces under its ambit as an integral part of its consolidation of power in a country shattered by years of civil war.

In line with this agenda, President Ahmad al-Sharaa, previously of the Sunni Islamist Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) group, and SDF commander Mazloum Abdi signed an agreement on March 10, 2025. It stipulated that the SDF-controlled civilian and military institutions in the Kurdish-led autonomous region will be integrated into the Syrian state apparatus.

However, the modality of such an integration was disputed. The SDF wanted their forces integrated into the Syrian military as a single unit, as opposed to the individualised approach adopted by the Damascus government.

The March agreement was scheduled to be implemented by the end of 2025, but disputes and clashes made it difficult to adhere to that timetable. Joint Syrian-Turkish offensives against the SDF and the fighting in Aleppo complicated the situation.

In recent days, the government forces have advanced to the cities of Raqqa and Deir al-Zor and seized control from the SDF, who have lost much of the non-Kurdish areas that they controlled. The government offered a short, four-day window to the SDF to have consultations among its members and decide on the modalities of integrating into the government forces and civil government.

This was done through a ceasefire agreement that came into effect on January 20, 2026. It offered to pause the advancement of government forces to major Kurdish cities like Hasakah and Qamishli. The ceasefire has been extended, but whether the pause will continue or a deadly offensive will ensue is the question.

Meanwhile, the US has been making it clear that the SDF is no longer an essential player for the protection of American interests in Syria. The US envoy to Syria, Tom Barrack, explicitly said so in a recent social media post. He stated that while the SDF had been the “most effective ground partner against IS,” the situation has “fundamentally changed” today, and the SDF’s original purpose has “largely expired”.

He indicated that support earlier extended to the Kurdish forces would not be forthcoming in the future, as the US is backing the al-Sharaa government’s efforts to bring the administration of Kurdish areas under their control.

How has the new government dealt with the Kurds thus far?

While the advancement of government troops to the SDF-controlled territories in northeast Syria is ongoing, the government is also trying to win over Kurds by addressing long-held grievances of the Kurdish population.

Decree No. 13, issued by President al-Sharaa on January 16, is a milestone document as it recognises the Kurdish cultural and linguistic identity. It declares Kurdish as a national language and Nowruz a national holiday.

Kurdish fighters with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are cheered by local residents ahead of the end of a four-day truce with the Syrian government in Hassakeh, northeastern Syria, Saturday, Jan. 24, 2026. (AP Photo/Baderkhan Ahmad)

Most importantly, the decree grants citizenship to the stateless Kurds. It asserts that the Kurds are an integral part of the Syrian nation and thereby rejects the political autonomy of the Kurdish region. But whether the approach of military threats, on one hand, and the acceptance of Kurdish demands for political and cultural recognition on the other, results in an amicable situation is difficult to predict.

What does this current round of fighting mean for US interests in the region, and the Middle East as a whole?

Trump’s meeting with al-Sharaa on May 4, 2025, during the former’s visit to Saudi Arabia was a significant development. Later, they met at the White House.

The clear US support for the Sharaa government’s efforts towards establishing full control over Syria’s fractured lands has been seen by the Kurds as a major shift in US policy, away from its support for the SDF and Kurdish autonomy.

However, there are concerns, too. Many former IS fighters and their civilian supporters are detained in Syrian military facilities. Syrian government forces have taken control of some of them. The US is trying to shift detainees to Iraq as it is concerned about IS fighters escaping amid the conflict.

Elsewhere in the region, US allies like Turkey, which also has a Kurdish population and considers the SDF a terrorist organisation, welcomed the shift. Turkey regarded the previous US-SDF alignment as an irritant in its relations with the US.

In general, governments in West Asia that have a major Kurdish population want to discourage Kurdish autonomy, even though it is a reality in northern Iraq. As a result, the advancement of Syrian government forces to Kurdish autonomous areas has created a volatile security situation.