On February 6, the United States and Iran engaged in fresh negotiations, after five rounds of indirect talks in April-May 2025 that were broken off by joint Israeli and American bombardment of Iran in June. In the months since, while neither Iran nor the US ruled out further talks, mutually hostile rhetoric remained high. By January 2026, the US President had outlined new casus belli (reasons for war) – that Washington would supplement Iranian anti-regime demonstrations with military action to help topple the regime.
Even as Trump oscillated between conciliation and threats, the weeks preceding the talks saw the US move a carrier strike group, guided missile destroyers, Delta Forces, drones and reconnaissance aircraft, new air defence batteries, and other assets to the Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea, the Mediterranean, and the 19+ bases in the region where about 40,000-50,000 US troops operate.
Should the US attack, Iran has threatened to blockade the Strait of Hormuz, retaliate against US targets such as Al Udeid airbase in Qatar, the headquarters of the US Navy Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, US bases in Iraq, as well as targets in Israel. Apart from conducting its own IRGC-led exercises in the Persian Gulf, Iranian forces have thus far carried out probing manoeuvres against US assets as well as seized oil tankers. Amidst these developments, what is pushing Washington towards negotiations? What can either side concede? Where do they go from here?
Why the dual approach?
US President Donald Trump’s conduct thus far and his willingness to go to war have been suspect. For instance, when Trump posted on January 2 that the US was “locked and loaded” to help protestors, US military strength in the Middle East was at its thinnest in decades, especially given deployments in the South China Sea and the Caribbean. Moreover, as Iran successfully contained both riots and protests (killing over 3,000 at least), the US President changed his rationale for military build-up – the need to contain the Iranian nuclear threat that he had asserted was “obliterated” in June 2025.
Continuing to use anti-regime demonstrations as Washington’s rationale for an attack contained a significant risk. The US would either get bogged down in a protracted war with potent spillovers (given Iran’s geography, diffused domestic bases of political power, and its remaining proxy networks) or would have to exit early without accomplishing maximalist goals (as was seen in the US’ brief war against the Yemeni Houthis in April/May 2025).
Ultimately, for the US President, it is a deal on Iran’s nuclear question that matters, especially if it can outdo the Barack Obama-era Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action of 2015. Trump’s approach, however, is not to instil more good faith in the dialogue but rather coerce and weaken Iran’s bargaining position through military encirclement to gain better concessions in the deal.
For Tehran, the inevitability of engagement with Washington to urgently secure sanctions relief has long been evident. However, Iran is also keenly cognisant of a peculiar leverage. Thus far, Tehran’s threats of retaliation have been similarly maximalist; that Iran will attack third states which house US assets as well as Israel, even if the original US attack is symbolic. This zero-sum approach to the military theatre arguably helps Tehran push for non-zero outcomes in the diplomatic theatre.
Moreover, Iran is also aware of the possibility of a repeat of June 2025, when it faced joint US-Israeli bombardment at the height of diplomatic engagement with Washington. This almost necessarily requires a hardline military position, not to undermine talks but rather to reinforce them – to show the US President that war will be the path of most resistance, which would not be ideal for a (self-proclaimed) dealmaker/peacemaker.
The red lines, and a possible concessionary space
For Iran, there are two broad redlines. First, Iran’s sovereign right to enrich uranium on its own soil is inalienable. Second, that negotiations on Iran’s ballistic missile programme or its relationship with regional non-state actors are not on the table; these are nuclear negotiations only, as reiterated by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi on Saturday. For the United States, Iran must forfeit enrichment rights on its soil, give up its existing stock of 60% enriched uranium, halt ballistic missile development, and cease support to its regional non-state allies. These latter two demands are especially encouraged by Israel, whose Prime Minister is set to travel to Washington on Wednesday to press this point.
Beneath these antagonistic positions, space for concessions theoretically remains. From Tehran’s perspective, relinquishing its stockpile of 60% enriched uranium (especially to Russian hands) remains a possibility. In any case, Russia has long been the only foreign power to operate a nuclear power plant in Iran (Bushehr). Additionally, if Iran’s long-term right to enrich uranium remains intact (with provisions for IAEA inspections), Tehran could characterise short-term restrictions as a tolerable measure – especially if a multi-nation consortium can supply fuel for Iranian nuclear plants, similar to the UAE’s Barakah plant. Similarly, on ballistic missiles, should Washington be amenable to regulations/restrictions on their use rather than their development, Tehran could view it as a long-term win.
The imperative to retain a potent missile programme (regardless of the nuclear question) has arguably seared itself, especially after the 12 Day War, when Iranian missiles successfully and extensively breached Israel’s layered air defence. The question of Iran’s non-state allies, however, is an open question. Even if Iran agrees in principle to halt support to its Axis of Resistance, it is improbable that this is a verifiable demand. Decades of operations through subversive and covert networks, in an internationally hostile environment, have given Iran significant expertise to continue such support even if it formally agrees to cease.
What comes next?
Over the last two decades, US-Iran talks have been infamous for their sluggish pace, the counter-productive format, and severe dearth of good faith between negotiating parties (who usually speak through an intermediary). Mutual trust has only declined further over the last 12 months. Given how both sides are poised presently, there is a real risk of inadvertent escalation.
In particular, the United States is the party which has no clearly defined war threshold (for Iran, it is any US attack). Notwithstanding the lack of clear operational objectives, the US military buildup to pressure Iran into concessions risks creating a commitment trap for Washington, forcing it into attacking Iran to save face. Regardless of the nature of the Iranian retaliation, Trump’s choice of means might ultimately jeopardise the ends that he seeks, as it will scuttle negotiations again.
Both sides are undoubtedly aware of the dangers of their positions, even as they blame each other for it. Hence, on February 6, Washington and Tehran arguably did not negotiate merely to de-escalate, but also to manage expectations and to “set a framework for future talks” as Araghchi characterised it. While both Washington and Tehran described the February talks as positive and committed to subsequent negotiations, it remains true that negotiations over a two-decade old issue can only be successful only if a modicum of good faith is restored.
In its absence, both sides are likely to press for more time until they believe their respective bargaining positions are sufficiently strong. While Israel remains the joker in the pack (as it was in June 2025), Tel Aviv arguably also prefers military action only if Washington promises to stay decisively engaged until the regime is toppled. Anything short will cause manifest harm to joint Israeli/American deterrence against Iran, as it will establish Trump’s strong aversion to protracted wars and US troops being bogged down in transition operations like in Afghanistan and Iraq (and Iran promises to be significantly worse).
Bashir Ali Abbas is a Senior Research Associate at the Council for Strategic and Defense Research, New Delhi
This combo shows Steve Witkoff (left), White House special envoy, and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. (AP File) 
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