Expert Explains: As START treaty expires, why Europe’s security calculus is under (nuclear) cloud

NATO Trumped

NATO, the bedrock of transatlantic unity created post World War II, was in a colloquial sense meant to ‘keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down’. In those days, the last was obvious, but the first worried the UK, the victorious European ally, which was thus clear that the US should not be allowed to retreat to its Monroe Doctrine (1823), focussing its interest only in the Americas. NATO’s core is, therefore, its Article 5, which says that an attack on one is an attack on all. US President Donald Trump, however, believes that the US’s core interests are in the Americas — the now rechristened “Donroe” doctrine.

The US GDP is roughly USD 31 trillion, and it has a population of 345 million; the Europeans add up to USD 28 trillion with around 600 million people. With such economic might, why are the Europeans ‘down’ and unable to ‘keep the Russians out’ by themselves, even 80 years after WWII and 30 years since the collapse of the Soviet Union?

An answer lies in their far lower military spend and build-up as compared with the US. In NATO, of the USD 1.6 trillion estimated annual defence expenditure, the US spends more than half, at around USD 980 billion. Even now, more than 65,000 US troops remain in Europe.

For many years, the Europeans have availed the free ride on security offered by the US, allowing it to consolidate its hegemonic power. Now, they find geographically find themselves between two powers that own 90% of the nuclear warheads in the world. Russia has over 5,500 warheads, the highest, followed by the US at over 5,000. China with 600 comes next. In Europe, UK and France are nuclear powers, but together do not have 600 warheads.

Cold War, cold thaw

The first decade post the Soviet Union saw the West follow ‘détente’, i.e. engagement, with Russia. The Europeans benefited and built a relationship of cheap oil and trade. But the fear of Russia continued to be egged on by neocon ideas, which wanted to prevent the resurgence of a Soviet-like superpower. NATO, thus, pushed ever eastward, closer to the Russian border, and began eyeing Ukraine, a country the Russians see as indelibly linked with them.

The break came in in 2014, when Russia took Crimea from Ukraine, and full-scale war broke out eight years later. In a sense, Trump seeks going back to the détente, while the Europeans now stand in fear of Russia.

In his first term, Trump had demanded that that the Europeans step up their defence spending to 2% of their GDP (Germany, the largest European economy, spent only slightly more than 1% on defence in 2014). But Trump 1.0 was still an institutional presidency where many of his advisors were retired generals, for whom the transatlantic bond was a red line.

Deals and dilemmas

Eight years later, Trump forced NATO members to up their military spending to 5% of their GDP, a tough financial call that many find politically challenging.

Trump wants to do deals, including with the biggest competitors, China and Russia, as he sees opportunities with them. They, the Chinese and Russians, appear to see merit in going along — a major case in point being not vetoing UNSC 2803 that has created the Trump-led Board of Peace. The Europeans, on the other hand, are seen as obstructionists, touting a rule-based order that restricts Trumpian enterprise.

Where India stands in all this

In the past, transatlantic divergences have created a certain multipolarity and provided space for the global south, including India, to pursue multi-alignment and seek global collaborative action on their development challenges, climate change, humanitarian action, etc. Indeed, India is pursuing such a course, with the EU trade deal being an example.

A major rupture in transatlantic unity would not only hurt Europe, it would also puncture the combined heft of the West (the G7 is still around 45% of nominal global GDP) and have consequences for the world, providing openings for Chinese hegemony.