Expert Explains | Why China’s new Atlas drone swarm system could worry India and the world

The Atlas system can simultaneously launch up to 96 small- and medium-sized speed drones that can form defensive structures and precision formations, both to defend and attack.

The launch time between drones is less than three seconds. Thus, within 300 seconds, the system can launch all 96 drones for an attack, reconnaissance, or to confuse the adversary. For context, amid the recent West Asia war, the US advanced E-3 Sentry AWACS aircraft at the Prince Sultan Airbase in Saudi Arabia was destroyed by a swarm of 29 drones and a few ballistic missiles.

The entire Atlas system consists of three units — a Swarm-2 ground combat vehicle, a command vehicle, and a support vehicle. A single Swarm-2 ground combat vehicle can carry and launch 48 fixed-wing drones, and a single command vehicle can simultaneously control up to 96 drones in a swarm. Its size and mobility make it extremely useful for reconnaissance, interception, and attack on high-value targets.

Currently, China’s Atlas system, at least theoretically, outpaces and outsmarts all its competitors.

Purely on scale, the US Department of War’s “Perdix” and Defense Advanced Research Project Agency’s “Offset” systems can launch 103 micro-drones and 250 unmanned systems, respectively. Even China’s “mothership” (Jiu Tian) can launch up to 100-150 drones. But Atlas stands out for its intelligence because, in modern military warfare, counting drones within the swarms is an outdated metric.

The real victory lies in the cognitive test: can these 90 to 100 drones think individually and as a unit, reroute, identify, reidentify targets, and execute multiple strikes — all with only a single human touchpoint. It is here that the Atlas Drone Swarm system outshines all its competitors, at least theoretically.

Who is the manufacturer?

China Electronic Technology Group Corporation (CETC) (zhongguo dianzi keji jituan gongsi), established in 2002, one of the leaders of China’s push for achieving civil-military integration, has manufactured the Atlas system. It is a state-owned electronics and telecommunications conglomerate and works with the PLA.

CETC operates in a hub-and-spokes model. It is only a 20-year-old organisation, but its research, technology, and manufacturing labs predate its birth. CETC has been responsible for China’s major defence electronic breakthroughs, including the technology that gave China its first nuclear bomb, guided missile, and geo-orbital satellite.

It works very closely with multiple Chinese technology giants, including Huawei and ZTE, and some divisions within CETC are sanctioned by the US Commerce Department. In 2021, it became the third-largest electronics and telecommunications organisation in China after Huawei and Lenovo.

Previously, it has also been responsible for developing China’s predictive behavioural patterns and technology for “policing” in the northwestern province of Xinjiang, home to the Uyghur Muslims. Zhenhua, a CTEC-affiliated company, reportedly oversees a massive database of digital footprints of over 2.5 million influential individuals worldwide, including politicians, diplomats, journalists and military officers. It was also responsible for building networks and radars used in the recent militarisation of the South China Sea.

Has the Atlas system been tested or deployed? Could it be exported?

The Atlas system has undergone multiple advanced tests. This includes the March test, when the PLA conducted the first full media demonstration for it.

However, the Chinese government has yet to announce its potential export variant. There are two arguments on this: At first glance, this system appears very similar to a top-tier, state-of-the-art strategic asset class, such as China’s J-20 stealth fighter and the United States’ F-22 Raptor. Countries don’t prefer exporting such asset classes.

But there are exceptions to the rule: Russia is willing to share the export version of its Su-57 stealth fighter jet and has already sold S-400 advanced air defence system to India. The commercial English naming of this asset class and the display of its components at the November 2024 Zhuhai Airshow indicate that an export element is attached to it.

More broadly, what is the role of drones and drone swarms in the Chinese armed forces?

Conceptually, as detailed in the 2020 version of The Science of Military Strategy (zhanlue xue), a publication of China’s Academy of Military Science, “intelligentization” (zhi neng hua) is a defining paradigm of future conflicts. The 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) explicitly stated that future wars will be “uncrewed and intelligent” and called to “steadily advance national defense and military construction”.

In the past 50 years, China has consistently learned from others’ wars. For instance, the two Gulf Wars compelled the PLA to pursue a strategy of winning local wars under informatised conditions. Similarly, China is taking notes on drone use from recent conflicts, including the Russia-Ukraine war, the Israel-Palestine conflict, India’s Operation Sindoor, and the US’s Operation Epic Fury.

On the ground, China has amassed a substantial number of surveillance, attack, reconnaissance, advanced, and loitering ammunition drones and drone systems. The intelligent guesswork is that China has tens of thousands of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles across all four variants — smaller drones, medium-altitude long-endurance, high-altitude long-endurance, and advanced, novel, and stealth drones.

These have been deployed across all PLA theatre commands and military districts and have been regularly included in operations in the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, and around the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with India. Some of them are also tested in Ukraine, Gaza, and with Houthi Rebels around the Red Sea area.

In the past 18 months, the PLA has also tested a “drone mothership” (jiu tian) capable of releasing 100-150 smaller loitering drones. Now, the PLA is moving towards studying and testing applications in real war simulations, such as amphibious landing military operations and island blockade scenarios.

What are the implications of these developments for India, and the Taiwan contingency?

Commissioning the Atlas system with the PLA’s Eastern and Western Theatre Commands and the Xinjiang and Tibet Military Districts could influence any future conflict’s outcome at various stages. The Atlas system can confuse and overwhelm Taiwan’s and India’s air defences, forcing these countries to waste multiple resources on eliminating them, which is difficult given its mobility and camouflage.

Furthermore, the system’s algorithm-driven kill chain and autonomous, independent target identification make it lethal against strategically valuable targets.

Especially on the India front, Tibet’s advanced road and rail network enables quick deployment and launch. These swarms could also be used to disturb the Indian army’s logistics and infrastructure lines by attacking the approach roads to India’s forward-deployed posts. Behind enemy lines, attacks isolate the forward posts, thereby making it easier for the aggressor to coerce them.

Finally, counter-jamming these swarms is challenging since they share information and adjust formations and targets without central human intervention.

Suyash Desai is a political scientist and a non-resident fellow with the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia, United States.