After decades of reactionary policies, BNP has chance to calibrate its India stance. Can it seize the moment?

The BNP has waited long for this moment in Bangladesh history. It appears to be among the early frontrunners for the national elections.

The party has a history of anti-India politics, right from its provenance under Gen Ziaur Rahman — whose grave Tarique Rahman visited upon his return. Here’s a look at how the BNP’s position on India has evolved over the years.

Under Gen Ziaur Rahman & Khaleda Zia

First, it is essential to understand the founding years of the BNP and its raison d’être. For Gen Ziaur Rahman (Bangladesh President from 1977 to 1981), who founded the party in 1978, a key driver of his policies were reactions to those of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

Essentially for the BNP, with the objective of Bangladeshi independence having been met, it was Mujib’s turn to authoritarianism domestically that needed to be countered. By extension, this also meant the need to undo Mujib’s foreign policy choices.

These choices included the following: the Indo-Bangla Friendship Treaty (1972) which required mutual consultations on security threats and prohibited participation in any military alliance aimed at the other, India’s alleged assistance in helping Mujib create a personal paramilitary (Rokkhi Bahini) which Zia (a military man) viewed as a cardinal sin, his “concessions” to India on the Farakka Barrage without a formal treaty (fair water sharing was crucial for Bangladesh with India as the upper riparian), and his blanket imposition of secularism on Bangladesh which Zia viewed as alienating Bangladesh from its Islamic identity by mimicking the Indian Constitution as well as pre-empting deeper relationships with Gulf nations (who were largely aligned against New Delhi at the time, favoring Pakistan).

Theoretically, the BNP’s quest to be distinct meant attempting diversification in Bangladesh’s foreign partnerships. Functionally, it meant undoing Mujib’s and Hasina’s predominant focus on partnerships with one country — India.

As a result, Zia internationalised the Farakka Barrage issue by invoking it at the 1976 UN General Assembly and the Colombo NAM (Non-Aligned Movement) Summit, removed secularism from the constitution and actively pursued a deeper relationship with OIC (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation)  states, and undid core security coordination clauses of the Friendship treaty to pursue a deeper relationship with Beijing instead

Under Khaleda Zia’s premiership (1991-96; 2001-06), the BNP sharpened its anti-India logic — especially as a counter to the Awami League under Sheikh Hasina (elected as the party’s chief in 1981).

In both her terms, Zia oversaw a significant downturn in the bilateral relationship.

The BNP’s China focus remained, with a Defence Cooperation Treaty signed with Beijing in 2002 which cemented China’s role as Dhaka’s principal supplier of military equipment, a role it continues to play.

It also opposed transit arrangements with India, such as Indian access to Bangladeshi ports or a tri-nation pipeline to Myanmar, on the grounds that it would dent Bangladeshi sovereignty.

It passively allowed anti-Indian Northeastern militants safe havens in Bangladesh. And it assumed an entrenched and adverse position on disputes relating to the India-Bangladesh maritime boundary.

Additionally, the BNP under Khaleda Zia warmed up to Pakistan with fresh diplomatic interactions; this effort was also influenced by the BNP’s partnership with Islamist parties such as the Jamaat-e-Islami. While there were other catalysts for the BNP’s anti-India posture, such as the Babri Masjid demolition of 1992, which Bangladesh protested through a Parliamentary resolution, the BNP’s main effort was to “correct” the Awami League’s measures. For the BNP, under both Gen Zia and Khaleda Zia, India’s role in the 1971 war could not translate into lopsided influence over Dhaka’s political trajectory. Intertwined with the BNP’s aversion to the Awami League’s own special relationship with New Delhi, this ensured heightened friction between India and Bangladesh during Khaleda Zia’s tenures and held up key areas of cooperation, such as energy.

The ‘Battling Begums’ and Hasina’s consolidation

Until at least the 2008 elections, the BNP served as an effective counterweight to the Awami League, with Bangladesh’s politics being dominated by the “Battling Begums”, as characterised by international observers. This changed significantly as Hasina consolidated power in Dhaka following 2008, the year BNP’s Tarique Rahman was indirectly sent into exile by a caretaker government.

In the 2008-2024 period, the BNP was incrementally but steadily pushed out of the formal political space due to Hasina’s structural changes to Bangladesh’s political system.

Hasina’s abolition of the caretaker government setup (which takes power to oversee elections) in 2011, and the Awami League’s alleged rigging of the 2014 elections (which the BNP boycotted and thus lost its formal parliamentary opposition space) began an ostracisation of the BNP which only progressively deepened. In 2018, Khaleda Zia was placed under house arrest.

The loss in the BNP’s potency allowed Hasina to conclude agreements on key issues with India (which the BNP had earlier opposed) such as the settlement of land/maritime boundaries.

By 2022-2023, Hasina had ridden out the BNP’s sovereignty-based criticism sufficiently to concretely offer India transit access through Chottogram and Mongla in her third consecutive term.

By July 2024, after two more elections marred by allegations of rigging and malpractice, the BNP’s effectively leaderless cadre was subject to aggressive law enforcement, especially through the “rapid action battalion” (sanctioned by Washington for human rights violations in 2021). The party had also lost access to its formal media organisations — among other political and logistical losses.

In all those years, the BNP’s criticism of India spiked especially during election years — but remained low overall. This was principally due to its focus on self-preservation since 2008.

Having lost access to institutional heft under Hasina’s 15-year rule, the BNP relied on street mobilisation and non-institutional methods to organize its politics (Sammabesh). This led to greater alignment with Islamist, anti-Hasina, anti-India and pro-Pakistan actors (led by the Jamaat).

Note, however, that the BNP has always claimed as equal (or higher) a share in the nationalist pie as Hasina. Unlike the Jamaat, the BNP has competed with, and not contested, the Awami League’s nationalism, such as by focusing on Zia-ur-Rehman’s inextricable role in sculpting the Bangladeshi resistance in 1971, just as the Awami League focuses on Mujib’s legacy.

The August 2024 watershed moment

After 2024, the BNP has found itself in an unprecedented position where its principal nemesis has been effectively consigned to the underground (save a few pockets like Gopalganj) and its leadership forced into exile.

The BNP’s domestic and foreign policies have been reactionary right from its nascence. It has focused on countering and balancing the Awami League’s policies whenever it wrested power.

The 2024-2025 period then is arguably the first moment in Bangladeshi history where the BNP has found sufficient space to be proactive. While its need to continue countering Hasina’s rhetoric (which she has kept up from New Delhi) remains, it now does so with the confidence of being Bangladesh’s most experienced formal political force.

It is this predicament that has also allowed the BNP to adopt a more pragmatic posture, even displaying the moral high ground. In fact, this pragmatism is imperative if the party is to distinguish itself from the Awami League. Domestically, this has meant a cautious posture towards new actors such as the National Citizen’s Party (even the interim government itself) who could potentially threaten the rewards of the BNP’s long years of patience.

Since August 2024, the BNP has focused on advocating for early elections (unlike the NCP and Jamaat), has given no indications of formally re-allying with the Jamaat (and has even chastised it), and has guarded against inflammatory rhetoric that could promote instability and violence (and thus potentially delay polls). This same pragmatism has also led to the BNP refusing to support the interim government’s ban on the Awami League.

Similarly, with the original source of opposition (Awami League) now diluted, in the immediate weeks after the August 2024 upheaval, senior BNP leaders focused on re-framing the party’s approach to India early. In that August, BNP Secretary General Mirza Alamgir called for a “friendly relationship with India” based on “mutual respect” with the “one-sided relationship” now over.

The next month Tarique Rahman himself highlighted “deep historical and geographical ties” and asserted that the BNP seeks “a relationship with India that respects the aspirations of the people of Bangladesh”; the BNP’s nationalism was “pro-Bangladesh and not anti-India” in his words.

In the following months, other leaders asserted that India was Bangladesh’s “most important neighbor”, that Bangladesh’s “soil would not be used by terrorists”, and that “cooperation with India was not an option, but a necessity” (among other statements). More recently, Tarique Rahman swiftly expressed gratitude for PM Narendra Modi’s public expressions of concern for Khaleda Zia’s health.

The fundamental pillars of the BNP’s long nourished anti-India posture still remain — a new relationship with Pakistan, the question of water sharing (with the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty expiring in December 2026), and the future of Sheikh Hasina. However, the BNP can now afford to calibrate its expressions on these issues.

The degree to which the BNP does so will also be contingent on the party’s need to cater to populist sentiments and to also prevent ceding that space to the Jamaat, especially after having relied on street power for over a decade.

Moreover, it also needs to constantly stay cognisant of the Awami League’s efforts to pave its way back to power. After all, if the BNP can survive for 15 years underground with its leaders in exile or under house arrest and still storm back to the national stage, so can the Awami League.

Hence, the BNP that India may deal with in the future, should it win the February polls, will undoubtedly be different and arguably more amenable to cooperation. But Hasina’s continued threats to Dhaka, the rise of a new political class in Bangladesh, and a polarised regional geopolitical environment featuring fresh India-Pakistan hostility, would also mean that any government taking power in Dhaka would face an uncertain path vis-à-vis India.