Bangladesh is set to go to the polls on February 12. The elections to the 13th Jatiya Sangsad will feature close to 2,000 candidates vying for 298 seats.
Among the prominent parties, the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) is contesting 288 seats, the Jamaat-e-Islami 224 seats and the National Citizens Party 32 seats.
Bangladesh’s first palpably free and fair election in 17 years will also be accompanied by a constitutional referendum — a yes/no vote on the July National Charter. The charter comprises 80 constitutional changes drafted by the Muhammad Yunus-led interim government.
The Awami League, meanwhile, remains banned from contesting. In New Delhi, Awami League leaders held a press conference in New Delhi on January 17, followed by a recorded address by former prime minister Sheikh Hasina just six days later.
The party, which maintains that it is still the de jure government of Bangladesh, has called the February elections a “sham”, chastised Chief Adviser Yunus, and criticised the ban on it.
Hasina’s public comments drew sharp reactions from the interim government in Dhaka, which called it “hate speech” that “may seriously impair the ability” of a future elected government to engage with India.
Amid these developments, how are the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami-led factions preparing for the polls? What does Bangladesh’s political transition look like?
The BNP-led alliance
The BNP is expected to attract a considerable proportion of the vote. After the death of former chief Khaleda Zia, it received a boost with the return of the de facto leader-in-exile Tarique Rahman, who is now party chief.
India, which had forged close ties with Hasina and the Awami League, is now hedging its bets by increasing its engagement with the BNP. Helping this engagement is the BNP’s own pragmatism and a fresh conciliatory posture towards India.
Domestically, the party is arguably viewing the polls as a clean slate. This is principally because the BNP faces an unprecedented political landscape where its peer is absent. So, it is attempting to secure the entirety of the space left vacant — aiming for 288 of 298 seats — by making “change” its principal electoral platform.
Kicking off campaigning on January 22, Rahman has held rallies in key constituencies such as Dhaka, Sylhet, Moulvibazar, Habiganj and Kishoreganj on this premise. Functionally, this has meant that the BNP and its chief have not just criticised the Awami League but also its former ally, the Jamaat-e-Islami, leading to particularly heated exchanges.
For instance, Rahman has criticised the Jamaat for its Islamism and anti-independence role in 1971, declared its activities as kufr (infidelity) and alleged that the Jamaat was conspiring to rig the vote by collecting National Identity details from the electorate.
Nonetheless, if the BNP draws strength from its status as the only remaining legacy party, its characterisation as the “new establishment” by other political actors has also made this status a vulnerability as far as new voters are concerned.
The Jamaat-NCP Combine
The Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami appears more optimistic than ever about its electoral chances, especially after sweeping victories in multiple student union elections last year. Even if these university polls were not necessarily indicators of the national electorate’s mood, they helped the Jamaat test its election day booth-level tactics and targeted data-based strategies.
Like the BNP, the Jamaat is also viewing the February elections as a fresh slate. Its paltry electoral record is not a measure of its popularity in the run-up to the current polls. In fact, the party began assessing its electoral prospects immediately after Hasina’s ouster in 2024, initially pondering contesting 162 priority seats. The party’s expanded gamble in 224 seats reflects its increased confidence in the months since.
The Jamaat is looking to benefit from the electorate’s own desire for a fresh start and the potential for a non-BNP/Awami League elected government for the first time since 1971. Here, the unprecedented 750,000-strong, expatriate postal vote is crucial for the Jamaat as it looks to target Gulf-based voters, who constitute the largest section of Bangladesh’s diaspora.
But even if Bangladesh’s constituents vote for the Jamaat with a preference for change, rather than any attraction towards its Islamism, the Jamaat in effect promises to be a more Islamist force in power.
In the words of its General Secretary on January 23 in Khulna, the party views the election as a “constitutional jihad to establish Islamic values” and has viewed Rahman’s charges against its Islamist values as a “grave offence”, accusing the BNP of corruption, extortion, land-grabbing and “neo-fascism”.
For its part, the student-led National Citizens Party has relinquished itself to being a junior partner to the Jamaat — evidence of the NCP admitting to its insufficient appeal to voters due to its newness as a political force. The desire to create a non-BNP/Awami League bloc is the main common denominator between the NCP and Jamaat, which otherwise have little in common.
For India, it is the Jamaat which continues to be the principal risk in post-February Bangladesh. Apart from its Islamist credentials and its historic closeness to Pakistan, The Washington Post’s new reports of the US actively courting the Jamaat have enhanced this risk.
Systemic change
Adding to the “clean slate” feature of the elections is the July National Charter, about half of whose 80 proposed reforms are constitutional in nature.
These include (but are not limited to) the creation of a bicameral legislature, prime ministerial term limits, anti-defection provisions, a new Judicial Appointments Commission and, crucially, a provision that effectively bars the ruling party from unilaterally making further constitutional changes.
This is an exercise that is particularly troubling for the Awami League, which risks becoming the only major outsider to sweeping structural changes within Bangladesh’s polity, despite having been the country’s largest political party.
The BNP, too, is uncomfortable with the exercise but has acquiesced — for now. It feels that it can modify these changes if elected to power (of which it is confident). Parties such as the Jamaat and NCP are in favour of the charter, viewing the exercise as a unique opportunity to change the system which ensured Awami League/BNP dominance for over 50 years.
The interim government, while having drafted the reforms, has delegated the decision on implementing these constitutional changes to the electorate.
While the interim government views the conduct of the referendum itself as legitimate, its aggressive campaigning for a “yes” vote has drawn sharp criticism.
Several Bangladeshi constitutional experts such as Shahdeen Malik have called the campaign “illegal and unethical” interference by a government that has exceeded its mandate.
While the interim government’s partisan campaign also risks perceptions of ulterior interests, Bangladeshi newspapers such as The Daily Star have carried numerous editorials reflecting voter sentiment that an exercise of constitutional gravity is being reduced to a sub-plot in the elections. The interim government views its advocacy as being complementary to the mandate for change it was issued in August 2024.
If voters favour the charter, it is possible that a BNP-led government might slow-pedal particular systemic changes (especially those on which it sent dissent notes to the National Consensus Commission), but a Jamaat-led government is more likely to push for faster implementation. Ultimately, the referendum implies that Bangladesh’s political transition will not necessarily end with the February 12 elections.
Bashir Ali Abbas is a Senior Research Associate at the Council for Strategic and Defense Research, New Delhi.
Supporters of Bangladesh's Jamaat-e-Islami Party attend an election campaign rally ahead of next month's national elections, in Dhaka, Bangladesh, on January 22. (Photo: AP) 
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