Armenia polls: Why both the West and Russia have an eye on the elections of a small West Asian nation

And while Armenia is not as closely associated with India, it has emerged as a major buyer of Indian weapons systems, making its geopolitical shifts important for New Delhi.

Armenia and the EU, Russia conundrum

A nation of around three million people, Armenia is bordered by countries like Iran, Turkey and Azerbaijan. Its northern neighbour, Georgia, shares a border with Russia.

Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Armenia became an independent nation in 1991, but the countries maintained close ties. Six years later, Russia and Armenia signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. Russia also maintains a military base in Gyumri, Armenia’s second-largest city.

In 2015, Armenia joined the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), a move that came at a cost, as it had been negotiating an EU Association Agreement and a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area Agreement with the bloc since 2010. Those talks were abruptly suspended in 2013 under heavy pressure from Moscow.

Yet Armenia never fully abandoned the idea of engaging with the EU, and in 2017, Yerevan signed a Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with Brussels. The document didn’t have free-trade provisions to remain compatible with EAEU obligations, while expanding cooperation on governance and democratic reform. It entered into full force in March 2021.

Ukraine invasion, Nagorno-Karabakh

For several years, CEPA allowed Armenia to maintain ties with both the major geopolitical players in Europe. Then came Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, affecting the Armenia-Russia relationship.

But it was a second blow that did more serious damage, in the form of the military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, known as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It centres around a separatist mountain region in Azerbaijan bordering Armenia, with a large ethnically Armenian population.

Geographical and cultural links to Armenia have often led to conflict between the countries. In 2020, as Azerbaijan and Armenia went to war, Azerbaijan attacked Nagorno-Karabakh and is said to have received support from Turkey and Pakistan in the form of weapons and personnel.

Armenia then looked to Russia and the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), of which it was a part, for protection. Russia, however, did not intervene, arguing that CSTO only applied to Armenia’s internationally recognised region, which didn’t include Nagorno-Karabakh.

With Azerbaijan subsequently retaking Nagorno-Karabakh, over 100,000 ethnic Armenians were displaced from a region that had been under Armenian control for decades. Following the situation with Russia, Armenia froze its participation in the CSTO in February 2024, boycotted alliance meetings, and began buying weapons from India and France instead of its traditional supplier, Russia.

In 2022, the India-Armenia deal to supply Armenian armed forces with PINAKA multi-barrel rocket launchers (MBRL), anti-tank munitions, and ammunition worth $250 million was viewed as Delhi siding with Yerevan. In contrast, Azerbaijan’s proximity to Pakistan has been perceived as an irritant in the ties, as The Indian Express reported at the time.

Continued reliance on Russia

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, in power since 2018, has also begun to speak with increasing confidence about European integration over time.

In May 2026, Armenia hosted the 8th European Political Community (EPC) summit, alongside the inaugural EU-Armenia bilateral summit. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was also present and made several remarks about Russia, which Russia termed “categorically unacceptable”.

But a clean break from Russia will have a severe impact on Armenia. Around 82% of its gas came from Russia last year, and Armenia heavily depends on Russia for trade. It imports fuels and precious metals. Its export base in electronics and precious stones depends on market access from the EAEU membership.

Moscow is aware of this leverage. In the run-up to the vote, Russia imposed temporary bans on Armenian exports and threatened to cut cheap energy supplies. Moscow is sending a clear message: if Armenia aligns with the West, it will have to pay a price.

Meanwhile, EAEU members Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan have increased their pressure on Armenia by demanding it hold an urgent nationwide referendum to choose between EAEU membership and EU integration, with a formal review of Armenia’s membership status due by December 2026.

Pashinyan has refused to rush the referendum. He has called an immediate referendum “unreasonable,” insisting his government is not cutting EAEU ties and described its ties with Russia as being in a “transformation phase”.

Test for Russia

A victory for Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party would likely accelerate its deeper integration with the West.

The situation in Yerevan also points to waning Russian influence across its traditional sphere. Another case is that of Transnistria, a breakaway region of Moldova that borders Ukraine, which declared independence from Moldova in 1990 but is not recognised by any UN member.

Transnistria has hosted Russian troops since 1992 and has long served as Moscow’s foothold in the country. It is now under increasing economic pressure from Moldova’s pro-European government, which has imposed customs regulations and aligned trade rules with EU standards as it advances toward EU membership.

The June 7 election’s result will offer an early answer to a question that extends far beyond Armenia’s borders, on just how much leverage Russia still holds over the countries it once called its allies. It will also serve as an example for smaller states that are increasingly being pressed to choose a side in global conflicts.

The author is an intern with The Indian Express