When the war started, perhaps the whole world expected Russia to quickly overrun Ukrainian defences and occupy the capital, Kyiv. At the beginning of February 2022, then Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley reportedly told congressional leaders that in the event of a full-scale Russian invasion, Ukraine could collapse in 72 hours. It is now two years — and the Ukrainians have kept the Russian forces at bay and defended their country with a lot of resolve.
However, the momentum in the war today rests with Russia. The Ukrainian forces are feeling an acute shortage of equipment and manpower. Russia, on the other hand, has been able to successfully readjust and readapt their tactics to the new kind of war that is being fought. And most importantly, it has been able to protect its economy from Western sanctions. Today, the Russian economy is actually booming. This is something the West did not expect.
What do you mean by a “new” kind of war?
This is not the kind of blitzkrieg that, let’s say, we have seen the Americans do in Iraq, Afghanistan, and in other places, where there’s a shock-and-awe element — send a lot of airplanes, missiles, take out the enemy’s air defences, and then march in triumphantly and take over the country.
In Ukraine, the Russians met with a fairly resolute defence. And when they realised that this was going to be a longer war, they readjusted their tactics to that assessment.
One example is that of drones. Ukrainian drones initially had very significant successes. The Russians understood that — and not only did they adopt the use of drones themselves, they also found ways to defend against drones. So occasionally a drone will still go deep inside Russia, but they are not able to inflict the kind of damage they did in the first few months of the war.
To Europe, Russia appears more menacing today, while it itself remains dependent on the US for security. Donald Trump has said he won’t help countries that don’t spend on their defence. What’s in store for the trans-Atlantic military compact, within and outside the NATO framework?
There is no immediate challenge to the trans-Atlantic framework. NATO is not going to be shaken. If anything, NATO has been strengthened by Russia’s actions. New countries like Finland and Sweden have joined NATO, and the length of Russia’s border with NATO has in fact increased.
However, the war has impacted the economies of Europe, and so, politics is beginning to kick in. In some places, far-right political parties are taking advantage of the economic stress and the resultant frustration among people. But the overall support for the Ukraine war is not decreasing in Europe.
One definite consequence of the war is going to be greater militarisation of Europe. Countries across the continent will spend more on defence, and there will be a strong military security aspect to Europe in the near future.
Has the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza impacted the Russia-Ukraine war?
Yes and no. The Gaza conflict and brutality has definitely taken attention away from the war in Ukraine. Also, it is stretching US capacities, because the US has to now effectively fight on two fronts.
The US does not have to prove anything, but there is a perception that it is coming under stress. From that perspective, Ukraine’s anxiety about continued funding from the US and the West might increase.
In terms of the military aspect of the Ukraine war, the other conflict (in Gaza) has not had any significant effect.
But has the American and European support for the brutal Israeli campaign weakened their moral case against Russia?
The Americans are probably not looking at this from that point of view. They are looking at it from the point of view of their national interest.
They believe Israel has the right to defend itself, and therefore, they are all out in support. They do understand that their repeated vetoes in the United Nations against a ceasefire in Gaza is losing them support in the Global South. But they also recognise that while for the Global South this is a question of morality, in terms of hard capabilities, the region can’t do anything to influence policy either in Ukraine or in Gaza. So they are willing to live with that situation for some time more.
Where does Vladimir Putin stand, compared with two years ago? Has his stature grown because of the war?
This is a difficult judgment to make, because the information about Russia that is available to most of us comes primarily through a Western prism. But if you look at Russian media and the reactions of the Russian people, it would seem that Putin has retained his support base. He continues to enjoy popular support, as will be probably shown during the March election that he is widely expected to win.
Whether the war adds to his stature is a complex question. Most Russians do not like the concept of war. And even if they support Putin and support the war, they would like it to end quickly.
What has India gained or lost as a consequence of the war, in terms of the impact on its economy, and its global diplomatic standing?
India deserves praise for taking a very balanced position when the war started, and for refusing to join the chorus of condemnation of Russia. And while the war affected global supply chains and commodity prices, in some areas, India benefited.
One, India had sudden access to cheap Russian oil, which the Russians sold to India in large quantities and at a large discount. So it was able to withstand any shock of an oil price rise. Oil is a very sensitive issue for India because it imports 90 per cent of its domestic consumption.
India has also managed to maintain fairly good links on both sides. When the war started, India was able to get Indian students out of Ukraine safely. And recently, there have been visits by Ukrainian ministers to India.
Of course, historically, India has much stronger links with Russia. And that is likely to continue.
How has the war impacted China, which announced a “friendship without limits” with Russia?
The China-Russia relationship is stronger today, and trade has gone up too. China benefited by buying a lot of Russian crude, available, presumably, at a discount.
In strategic terms, China has been a gainer, because the US has been distracted. What is happening in Ukraine and now in Gaza keeps the US away from the Indo-Pacific and its containment policy of China, which Beijing would be quite happy about.
Had the US not been distracted, what would it have done with regard to China?
While the concrete plans are difficult to lay out, the United States would probably have undertaken steps to squeeze China militarily, maybe by supplying arms to Taiwan. Today, if the Chinese decide to move against Taiwan, would the United States have the capacity to fight a third war? Not that I think China is interested in militarily moving against Taiwan, but I think the Taiwanese would be looking for that kind of reassurance.
The second would be a greater focus on economic policy. The US has announced the desire to try and restrict the kind of technologies that go to China, but there is no consensus on that yet. For example, they still need to convince the Europeans to fully subscribe to that policy.
Two years of war later, how could the third year turn out? When might the war end, and how?
It is unlikely that Russia intends to take over all of Ukraine. So the question would be to try and understand what the Russians would consider to be a victory, and what such a victory would mean for the Americans and for Ukraine.
Second, I do not expect any peace talks to take place this year at least. If anything [like peace talks] starts, it will be next year.
At present, Ukraine’s peace plans and Russia’s peace plans are in contradiction. Ukraine’s peace plans are fundamentally premised on a return to the 1991 border, which is not acceptable to Russia. Russia incorporated Crimea in 2014 and, more recently, it has taken large chunks of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, Mykolayiv, and Zaporizhzhia. The Russians are not likely to accept any negotiation on these territories.
However, Putin has said that he is willing to negotiate. I suspect the Russians feel negotiations will only be meaningful if the Americans are involved in them. The Russian story is that this is a proxy war with the West, with NATO. So if at all negotiations are to be held, NATO would have to be present.
Nandan Unnikrishnan is a Distinguished Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, and one of India’s foremost experts on Russia. He spoke to Yashee.
In Ukraine, the Russians met with a fairly resolute defence. And when they realised that this was going to be a longer war, they readjusted their tactics to that assessment.
Share
