People are being offered cash, IVF support and housing to have more kids. Why is it not working?

In some ways, the transition has been expected. Many societies see smaller population increases over time, owing to improvements in health, education and economic indicators. But the pace and scope of this transition are unexpected.

Rapid TFR decline, surpassing projections

Among the most important figures in population growth is the total fertility rate, or TFR. It is the average number of children that a woman is expected to bear in her lifetime. A “replacement rate” of 2.1, that is, an average of two children per woman to replace the mother and father, is considered ideal to ensure population stability.

As of 2023, in over two-thirds of the total global population, TFRs were below 2.1.

Global fertility rates.

From a global average of 5.3 in the early 1960s, TFR stood at 2.2 in 2024 — just above the replacement rate. In the same period, the TFR in India declined from 5.9 to 2 — just under the replacement rate. Pronouncements like Andhra Pradesh’s thus mark a stark reversal from just a few generations ago, when population boom was counted among the biggest crises facing the nation, and family planning policies were introduced.

Moradhvaj Dhakad, a scientist and Marie Curie Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research (MPIDR) in Rostock, Germany, told The Indian Express, “The decline has happened much faster than UN projections from around a decade ago, which expected TFR to fall to under 2.1 between 2030 and 2035, but India achieved this level around 2020.”

The TFR of India.

Many drivers, known and unknown

According to the demographic transition theory, as societies move from low economic growth and education levels to prosperity, both birth and death rates fall, with little overall change in population as a result. But the widespread shift in just a few decades has prompted the search for other factors.

Income is often a starting point. Martin Kolk, an Associate Professor at the Stockholm University Demography Unit and Department of Sociology, told The Indian Express that in the past, people with smaller incomes had more children in many countries.

“It now appears that in more and more contexts, people with higher incomes are actually having more children, including rich East Asian societies such as Japan (TFR 1.1) and South Korea (TFR 0.7, among the lowest globally). It’s the richest individuals who have more children, but in middle-income countries, you often see the reverse pattern still,” he added.

Dhakad also chalked this up to growing urbanisation, which has raised the cost of living.

Women’s increased educational attainments, participation in the workforce and ability to make reproductive decisions also matter. In sub-Saharan Africa, with TFRs still as high as 4 and 5, high levels of teen pregnancies have been attributed to the limited use of contraception, lower education levels, and early marriages.

The endurance of traditional gender roles means that women end up shouldering domestic responsibilities in addition to working towards their career aspirations, and many then choose not to have children, or have fewer children. While India has a low share of women in the workforce, strides in health and education could have played a role, Dhakad said.

“Government population control campaigns such as hum do, hamaare do further spread family planning messaging even among the less educated groups, and in rural areas. Moreover, it has been found that development is the best contraception. For example, a greater focus on improving maternal and child health has helped lower the under-five mortality rate significantly. Parents realise that they do not need to have more children to ensure their survival into adulthood,” he said.

Still, these factors do not tell the whole story of countries like Sweden (with a TFR of 1.4), which are rich and have substantial state support for women after childbirth, alongside men making larger contributions to domestic responsibilities.

Kolk argued that these policies have helped prevent an even steeper decline in TFR: “In the Nordics, fertility has decreased from high to moderate levels and in southern Europe, it has fallen from low to very low levels. In these different contexts, the explanation is likely related to pro-family policy.”

“But if we want to understand why fertility is falling in basically all countries from 2010 and 2015 to 2025 — both in systems with more and less generous family policy —cultural reasons are probably more important. There has been some kind of value change in the world… people prioritise childbearing less,” he added.

Australian demographer Peter McDonald has argued that two major trends can be traced back to the second half of the 20th century. The first was a rise in social liberalism, marked by individuals re-examining social norms, picking and choosing what suited them, and focusing on individual aspirations. The other was the withdrawal of the welfare state in many Western economies.

One byproduct of these trends was that having children was no longer a mandate for living a good life.

Yet another trend is the rise in the number of single individuals and declining rates of marriage.

Others have suggested that the rise of technology and smartphones (which have led to fewer in-person interactions) and hardening political divides on gender lines could be preventing people from coupling up, while climate change-related concerns may be affecting the decision to raise children (particularly in the developed world).

Worry for society

Kolk said that already, the effects of very low TFR in some countries are noticeable: “In South Korea, for every newborn child, there are three-and-a-half 55-year-olds… When the fertility is so low, at 1 or below, then societies will face challenges in maintaining pension systems and paying for public health care for the elderly.” This will also likely lead to higher taxes on those in the working population.

With life expectancies increasing, “There will be very many elderly people within families and very few adult children to take care of them,” Kolk added.

Immigration has been suggested as a solution to the shortage of workers and caregivers, but has also led to a backlash. In India, too, the low TFRs of South Indian states are flashpoints in political debates about delimitation and political representation.

However, Kolk said that a TFR between 1.5 and 1.7 may not lead to dramatic socioeconomic challenges everywhere: “Society will be slightly ageing, but it’s something that most rich societies should be able to handle by re-designing the social policy system.” The private sector could also improve its policies, he said, noting that expectations of overtime work are prevalent in East Asia, which has very low TFRs.

Reversal unlikely, but state focus can help

Dhakad said, “In India, population will continue to increase because of the population momentum, thanks to a younger population.” But whether this “window of opportunity” is seized will depend on how governments channel existing human capital and meet the youth’s aspirations.

Gradually, India, too, will have to prepare for higher public spending on health — something states like Kerala are already planning for.

Kolk said that in societies that have gotten old before growing as rich, like China, increasing TFRs would have to involve “family-friendly policies that are more like European welfare states.” A return to the days of over-2 TFR is unlikely, with several factors influencing the decline, and mitigation could be a strategy. Dhakad added that “Overall, reducing fertility is easier than increasing fertility,” as countries are finding out.