In 1969, an arson attack on the disputed Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem triggered the hurried formation of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), with Palestine and Jerusalem among its priority areas.
Over 50 years later, something similar has unfolded following another conflict involving Israel, although at a more gradual pace. Israel’s war against Gaza sent shockwaves across the Middle East and the Islamic world, angering the masses against their rulers for their increasingly warming ties with Israel after decades of isolating it over the Palestine issue.
An indirect consequence of these events has been the creation of a new Turkey-Pakistan-Saudi Arabia defence pact, announced last week.
Israel sees its moment
Hamas’s October 7 attacks were preceded by Israel’s continued expansion across the West Bank and a hardened position against a Palestinian state’s right to exist. US President Donald Trump also led attempts to normalise relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. Saudi Arabia was expected to recognise Israel, contingent on the establishment of a Palestinian state.
As Israel’s brutal campaign began in Gaza, killing over 70,000 Palestinians to date, that proposal could no longer endure. In almost three years since then, other major regional and national developments have followed. Israel has targeted the top leadership of Iran-backed organisations like Hamas and Hezbollah, Syria’s Bashar al-Assad was toppled in late 2024, and the Ukraine-Russia war drags on, drawing Europe’s attention.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu saw these crises and Iran’s weakened position as an opportunity to install a pro-Israel regime in Tehran and nip its nuclear ambitions in the bud. Convinced by Netanyahu’s “shock and awe” strategy, the United States joined Israel’s war against Iran.
Questionable benefits
Had the Iranian regime fallen, Israel would have gained an upper hand to dictate the regional order. But as Iranian drones and ballistic missiles hit American and Israeli interests in West Asia, Iran’s defence capabilities and the absence of any significant anti-regime mobilisation caught Israel, the US, and the Arab states by surprise.
An unexpected strategy on Iran’s part was its seizing control of the Strait of Hormuz, squeezing global energy supplies. After six months of war, Iran emerged stronger, emboldened, and as a more serious challenge to the status quo of regional security under American guarantees.
The tripartite agreement among Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan comes amid this backdrop.
Incentives to agreement
For Gulf countries like Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel’s changing defence capabilities and regional ambitions proved to be a source of heightened insecurity. Pakistan and Turkey, on the other hand, faced only limited or indirect threats, but related factors have driven them to sign this pact.
In fact, Turkey-Saudi relations had deteriorated almost irreparably in 2017 over Turkey’s support for Qatar during the Qatar-Gulf diplomatic crisis. Saudi Arabia had also opposed a Pakistan-led initiative involving Malaysia and Turkey in 2019.
But another major consideration driving the Saudis’ engagement with these countries is the US. From 2017, when the Saudi Crown Prince hosted Trump in pursuit of an extraordinary defence relationship with the US, Saudi Arabia’s security outlook has today seen a major departure.
Differences over Israel and waning US interest in having a large presence in the region have led it to attempt to diversify its security ties. China is another potential partner in this regard.
In Pakistan’s case, the country had long been isolated in international politics over its dismal record on terrorism and its domestic economy. With the events in the Middle East, however, Pakistan found a unique place in Trump’s crisis-management strategy as a mediator. With another regional agreement, it is again seizing upon an opportunity to project power abroad.
For Turkey, there are clear incentives to the pact in its own deteriorating ties with Israel, and strikes that have reached its own neighbourhood during the conflict. And, as NATO’s second-largest military, a long-standing American partner, and a country with an expanding defence industry and growing technological capabilities, the pact presented a unique opportunity to reconnect strategically with West Asia.
Regional implications
Countries like Iran, Israel, India, and Greece are watching these developments with great curiosity and concern, owing to their security interests. While India, Israel, and Greece have been discussing defence cooperation with one another, Iran could find itself increasingly isolated if the new alliance were directed against it.
Indian observers had anticipated the agreement for some time, and Indian officials remained in contact with senior Saudi officials, including during National Security Advisor Ajit Doval’s latest visit to Saudi Arabia on July 20.
Among the three members of the new pact, Saudi Arabia has seen improved relations with India over the past decade, but the perception that New Delhi has done little to dissuade Israel from its wars in Gaza and Iran could prove to be a hurdle. India’s principled position on Palestine nevertheless remains unchanged: support for a two-state solution or a negotiated settlement, while simultaneously maintaining deeper strategic relations with Israel, particularly in defence.
More broadly, between 2014 and 2024, India-Gulf relations advanced significantly, with the UAE emerging as a key partner where Indian investors and businesses were accorded considerable importance.
Following the India-Pakistan conflict of 2025, there has been some rethinking in New Delhi about restructuring India’s approach. New Delhi appears increasingly convinced that it must be prepared to offer more to its Persian Gulf partners if it seeks deeper defence and strategic ties.
India’s unique relations with Russia and the United States, as well as its expanding partnership with the European Union, also offer it an important opportunity to contribute to peace and stability in the Gulf.
The tripartite agreement could become a challenge to India’s regional influence within the traditional security paradigm, at least in the short term. However, India’s economic prowess, advancing defence and technological capabilities, and wide-ranging diplomatic relationships give it considerable strategic autonomy to manage such shifts.
Omair Anas teaches international relations at Ankara Yildirim Beyazit University in Turkey.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif after signing a trilateral defence agreement in Mecca, Saudi Arabia (Photo credit: X/ @PakPMO) 
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