The Punjab and Haryana High Court has dismissed a retired Punjab Mandi Board employee’s plea seeking refixation of pay and consequential retirement benefits, holding that the petition was barred by inordinate delay and laches.
Justice Harpreet Singh Brar rejected Ajit Singh’s claim that his pay had been wrongly fixed in 1996, noting that he raised the grievance years after retirement without any reasonable explanation.
Ajit Singh was appointed as a chowkidar on June 1, 1979, and retired as Mandi supervisor on May 31, 2017. He argued that under the Revised Pay Rules, 1998, his basic pay had been fixed at Rs 6,000 instead of Rs 6,200 because he was not granted an annual increment due on January 1, 1996. He sought the quashing of the board’s reply dated November 7, 2025, and a direction to refix his pay, including arrears and retirement benefits.
The court noted that the alleged error occurred in 1996, but the petitioner made his first formal representation only on August 26, 2024, and followed it with a legal notice in August 2025.
Nirmal Singh Kandhola appeared for the petitioner, and Abhilaksh Gaind, along with Priya Jarial, appeared for the Punjab Mandi Board.
During the hearing, counsel for the petitioner conceded that the grievance arose in 1996 but could not provide any satisfactory explanation for the long delay in approaching the court.
Counsel for the respondents submitted that the petitioner failed to exercise his option under the Revised Pay Rules, 1998, at the relevant time, unlike another employee, Budh Ram, and remained silent throughout his service and for seven years after retirement. The claim, they argued, was a stale one barred by delay and laches.
‘Fence-sitters can’t be allowed to barge into courts’
In its ruling, the court said no compelling circumstance had been shown to explain the delay and relied on Supreme Court precedents to decline relief.
Quoting Chairman, UP Power Corporation Limited versus Ram Gopal, the court observed: “Whilst it is true that limitation does not strictly apply to proceedings under Articles 32 or 226 of the Constitution of India, nevertheless, such rights cannot be enforced after an unreasonable lapse of time.”
“Consideration of unexplained delays and inordinate laches would always be relevant in writ actions, and writ courts naturally ought to be reluctant in exercising their discretionary jurisdiction to protect those who have slept over wrongs and allowed illegalities to fester. Fence-sitters cannot be allowed to barge into Courts and cry for their rights at their convenience, and vigilant citizens ought not to be treated alike with mere opportunists.”
It further quoted the same judgment: “It is also a well-settled principle of law that ‘delay defeats equity’… It is now a trite law that where the writ petitioner approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on the ground of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to the other candidates who obtain the benefit of the judgment.”
The court also referred to Mrinmoy Maity versus Chhanda Koley and others and State of Uttaranchal versus Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari to reiterate that repeated representations do not revive stale claims and that delay must be assessed with reference to the original cause of action.
On pay fixation, the court referred to M R Gupta versus Union of India and Saroj Kumari versus State of Punjab, holding that wrong pay fixation constitutes a continuing wrong while an employee is in service, but ceases to be so after retirement. A petition filed with substantial delay after retirement is liable to be dismissed on grounds of delay and laches.
Citing Prem Nath versus State of Punjab, the court quoted: “So long as an employee ‘is in service’ a fresh cause of action arises every month when he is getting his monthly salary on the basis of a wrong calculation made contrary to rules… In the present case, however, the petitioners choose not to agitate their claim while in service. It is much subsequent to their superannuation that they have woken up and seek to gain impetus from certain decisions that may have been rendered in the case of similarly situated employees.”
Applying these principles, the court held that since the petitioner was no longer in service and had offered no plausible explanation for the delay, he could not claim the benefit of a continuing wrong. It declined to exercise writ jurisdiction and dismissed the petition.
During the hearing, counsel for the petitioner conceded that the grievance arose in 1996 but could not provide any satisfactory explanation for the long delay in approaching the court. 
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