Military Digest | The Tibetans who fought to liberate Bangladesh in 1971

With such secrecy surrounding them, it is no wonder the exploits of the Tibetan fighters of the SFF in the Chittagong Hill Tracts remain largely unknown to the average Indian.

The SFF exploits in East Pakistan

By the time the events of 1971 started unfolding, the Tibetans of Establishment 22, as the SFF was called initially, had been well trained. They had become experts in mountain and jungle warfare and in handling all kinds of weapons from mortars to rocket launchers. Many had become qualified paratroopers. Having waited in vain for an opportunity to fight the Chinese, they would now have the chance to prove their mettle, as well as their gratitude and loyalty to India, which had given them a home and a profession.

The feelings of the Tibetan volunteers at that time are reflected in a documentary called Tibetan Guerrillas in Exile—India’s Secret Army, produced by Loma Films. Lama Kunchok, a SFF veteran who fought in Bangladesh, speaks in that documentary about his determination to fight for Tibet’s freedom from China and “throw some dust in the enemy’s eyes”, but since that desire could not be fulfilled, he would harness every ounce of his fighting spirit to defend India. It was a sentiment that Uban found in abundance among the Tibetans of the SFF.

He knew where their special skills in guerrilla, mountain and jungle warfare could be best utilised—in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.

Pakistani irregular forces and Mizo rebels had already been operating from the Chittagong Hill Tracts and targeting Indian forces in the Northeast. If the unforgiving terrain of these hill tracts could be successfully mastered by the SFF, not only would a vulnerable flank of advancing Indian forces into Bangladesh be protected, but it would also cut off the Arakan road, which could be used by fleeing Pakistani troops to escape into Burma.

General Uban discussed these plans with Chief of Army Staff General Manekshaw, who was favourably inclined to use the SFF in this unconventional role. Uban also got the troops of the SFF to make a request in writing that they be allowed to take part in any future action planned against Pakistan. And thus the stage was set for the SFF’s heroic and historic role in the liberation war of Bangladesh.

The Chittagong Hill Tracts comprise dense, impenetrable jungle criss-crossed by several rivulets, riverbanks knee-deep in mud, and stretches of marshland, with hardly any demarcated tracks. To operate in this treacherous terrain required the highest levels of fitness, which the SFF Tibetans had achieved, as had the Indian Army officers chosen to lead them. Just moving from one point to another in that area was an obstacle course that was time-consuming and required careful advance planning. On top of these difficulties was the problem of the weather—severe storms frequently swept through the Chittagong Hill Tracts, which could cause heavy damage to equipment as well as make the ground even more difficult to navigate.

Three columns of the SFF were tasked for the operation in the hill tracts. One was to surround Chittagong via the Arakan road, the second was to do it via the Kaptai Dam-Chittagong road, and the third was to also aim to surround Chittagong through the Rangamati-Chittagong road.

The Kaptai dam was a prime objective of the SFF, as envisaged by Major General Uban and his team. He discussed this with Gen Manekshaw, who also wanted this dam destroyed as it was a major source of power for East Pakistan. The consequent flooding of the jungle would have made it very difficult for the Pakistan Army to carry out any meaningful operations in the area and thus neutralise their offensive potential in the hill tracts.

As mentioned earlier, cutting off the Arakan road was also of prime importance, as it was expected that the Pakistan Army would want to use this road to escape into Burma once they saw that defeat was inevitable. The Arakan road leads from Dacca to Chittagong and then to Cox’s Bazar and Burma.

‘Too little to achieve’

However, when Uban received final orders from the Army headquarters regarding the tasks assigned to the SFF, he was not happy—he thought that his troops had been given too little to achieve. According to the orders issued to him, the SFF was to blow up the Kaptai dam and certain bridges that formed crucial links in road communications. His troops were also supposed to “harass” Pakistan Army formations located in the area and prevent their effective employment against the Indian Army formations ranged against them.

Feeling that the full potential of his SFF troops would not be realised with these orders, Uban pleaded for additional objectives to be given to his men, which included the capture of the port of Chittagong. The port was a vital installation and a place where all supplies through the sea route arrived for the Pakistan Army in that theatre of operations.

The Army headquarters, however, felt that since the SFF lacked direct artillery and air support, it would not be possible to capture Chittagong with guerrilla action alone. The port had considerable Pakistan Army and naval presence, which would require an attack through air and artillery fire on the areas they were defending.

Uban’s argument that he would infiltrate 1,000 SFF troops into Chittagong and ensure that nearly 2,000 Mujeeb Bahini volunteers in the city would also rise up to support the SFF did not cut any ice with his superiors. The original orders stood for now.

After receiving the final go-ahead for what was named Operation Eagle, Gen Uban began moving the SFF to border areas in Mizoram opposite the Chittagong Hill Tracts. The force was moved there by air as well as by land. Uban had chosen Demagiri as his headquarters and three other places—Marpara, Bornapansuri and Jarulchari—where SFF columns would be based.

A guerrilla force is supposed to operate cut off from the main body of troops and to live off the land. This is exactly what the SFF troops did. Many were forced to live for days on end on just what fish they could catch from the rivulets when there were no helicopter sorties available to replenish their food supplies. There were instances when SFF columns attacked Pakistani positions on half-empty stomachs and captured them. Not only did this achieve the tactical aims of the commanders, but the captured Pakistani positions also provided the SFF with much-needed rations. The successes of the SFF eventually led it to surround the town of Rangamati, a prominent Pakistan Army stronghold, and eventually the force entered this town to a rousing civic reception. The Pakistani troops had fled from the town, leaving behind large quantities of fuel, arms and ammunition.

After the SFF destroyed the bridge at Dohazari and dominated the Sangu river, the possible Pakistani retreat to Burma using the Arakan road was no longer feasible. According to Maj Gen Uban, this was a major factor in forcing Lt Gen A A K Niazi, commander of the Pakistan Army’s Eastern Command in the Bangladesh theatre, to agree to unconditional surrender to the Indian Army on December 16, 1971.

At the end of the war, 29 medals were awarded to SFF officers who took part in Operation Eagle. The Indian Army personnel who participated in the operation with them received six Vir Chakras, five Vishisht Seva Medals, five Sena medals, 11 mentions in despatches, one Param Vishisht Seva Medal and one Ati Vishisht Seva Medal.

The Tibetan jawans of the SFF did not receive any gallantry awards given the fact that this was a covert force. According to one estimate, 56 Tibetans died in Operation Eagle and close to 150 were injured. More than 500 Tibetans received only cash awards for their gallantry in battle. A war memorial in Chakrata lists the names of all those who laid down their lives in the 1971 Bangladesh operations.

The Dalai Lama inspecting troops of the SFF. Pic courtesy: Maj Gen S S Uban’s estate