Military Digest | When Churchill wanted Indian Army to be cut to size at height of WWII

Churchill raised some issues pertaining to the Indian Army in a telegram to the Military Department (War Staff), India Office, on August 11, making certain observations. The UK documents mention that Churchill made the following points:

(a) He is increasingly concerned about the size of the Indian Army and desires, henceforth, quality rather than quantity. The present I.A. (Indian Army), in his opinion, bears no relation to old-time Indian units overseas and in India.

(b) How does the cost of the I.A. bear on inflation and other financial problems? By what process is it paid for?

(c) Further reductions, besides two divisions, are indispensable, and these should be selective. The Chiefs of Staff agree.

(d) Surplus weapons, as a result of reduction, should render it unnecessary to proceed vehemently with the Indian Munitions programme.

The voluminous documentation on the subject distils the basic concerns that Churchill had with the Indian Army. It concerned certain subversive activities that had taken place in some units and the fact that, due to the rapid expansion as a result of the war, recruitment from other classes of Indians had to be stepped up apart from the so-called martial classes. This was not to the British prime minister’s liking. Hence his observation on the Indian Army not being of the kind that it used to be.

“Field Marshal Lord Wavell, in his report in April 1943 on the subject of subversive attempts on the loyalty of the Indian Army, stated that there were at that time no signs that these attacks had been met with anything but very limited success, and he was confident that, provided preventive measures were taken to combat the subversive activities, the loyalty of the Army would remain unaffected,” the minutes of the Secretary of State dated September 20, 1943, mention.

General Auchinleck is quoted in the minutes as having stated that no drastic action was necessary or desirable, as the proportion of “doubtful material in the Army was negligible” in his opinion.

In a note on the size and composition of the Indian Army in August 1943, General Auchinleck provided a detailed breakdown of the roughly two million-strong Indian Army at the time, excluding State Forces, irregulars and other forces. Out of these two million troops, only about 1,250,000 were “combatants”, he pointed out.

Of these 1,250,000 combatants, 429,100, or about one-third, were in training establishments in various stages of development into soldiers.

Auchinleck bats for ‘non-martial’ recruits

The note prepared by the commander-in-chief states that the idea underlying the demand for reduction seems to be based on the notion that the Indian Army, owing to its great size and expansion, is now composed to a large extent of men who, because they belong to classes previously untried as soldiers, are unreliable and unsuitable.

This idea appears to have arisen from certain reports conveyed to the secretary of state concerning the disloyalty of certain elements among the prisoners of war in the hands of the Japanese, and because of certain disquieting incidents that have occurred from time to time in Arakan (in Burma) and elsewhere, he noted.

General Auchinleck then mentioned each such class of soldiers and the manner in which they were performing satisfactorily in the Army. Some of his observations are given below:

(a) Madrassis: Though this class was part of sappers and miners, their enlistment had been very limited for many years. Auchinleck noted that the newly enlisted Madrassis were doing very well in the Artillery and Signal Corps.

(b) Bengalis: The 37,000-odd Bengalis form a completely new class in the rank and file of the Army and are distributed mainly among the Ordnance Corps, Signal Corps and Engineers, especially in appointments requiring education and technical knowledge, for which they seem well suited, though an attempt to form a Bengali infantry regiment failed.

(c) Oudh Brahmins were formerly enlisted in considerable numbers until their recruitment was stopped when the Indian Army was reduced in size after the war of 1914-18, in which they did not distinguish themselves. They are now found widely distributed in the Artillery, Engineers, Infantry and Royal Indian Army Service Corps and are said to be doing well, having largely eschewed their caste prejudices, which handicapped them in the last Great War, and are noted for their good physique.

(d) There are 23,000 Indian Christians, a large proportion of whom come from Punjab, spread throughout the Army, with one or two new infantry units being wholly composed of this new class. They are reported to be doing well and are often indistinguishable from Muslim recruits from the same districts.

(e) Deccani Mussalmans formed one of the regular classes for enlistment in the Army until some years ago, when, owing to the reduction in strength of the Army, they were excluded due to the desire to include more favoured classes. There are now about 9,000 of them, mostly mixed with other Muslim classes throughout the Infantry, Engineers, Ordnance and Army Service Corps.

(f) Chamars (4,000) are an entirely new experiment, being a caste hitherto considered quite unfit for military service. They have been formed into an infantry regiment which, though not yet tried in battle, is said to be doing very well, and also in the Royal Indian Army Service Corps, where they have proved particularly useful in the newly raised animal transport units, for which it is difficult to find recruits from the other and older classes.

(g) Mahars (4,000) and Assamese (2,000) have been enlisted in newly raised infantry regiments bearing their names and promise exceedingly well.

(h) Meos have been enlisted in small numbers in certain units previously, and there are now 4,000 of them distributed in the Engineers and Army Service Corps.

(i) The Shilpkars, a tribe from the lower Himalayas, are confined to the new engineer battalions, in which they seem to be giving satisfaction.

“When considering the advisability of retaining these now or greatly expanded classes in the Army, it is necessary to remember that they are filling a place which cannot possibly be filled by the older and so-called ‘martial’ classes, which are literally unable to find the numbers required. In fact, the recruitment of the older classes has been pushed to such lengths that the recruits now coming forward from these are often of poor quality, and it is true to say that it is preferable to secure good specimens of the new classes, which can be obtained in satisfactory numbers, than to rely on poor specimens of the old classes,” said General Auchinleck.

And in a statement that reflected the position of the new Indian Army post-Independence, the General stated that there is little doubt that these classes must continue to have their place in the Indian Army of the future.

Churchill’s proposal was, thus, firmly shot down by the commander-in-chief.