Military Digest | An unsung 1971 battle: the crossing of Madhumati and capture of Kumarkhali

In this battle, troops of the 62 Brigade successfully crossed the Madhumati and seized the strategic town of Kumarkhali. The operation exemplified innovative amphibious tactics, including tanks swimming across a wide river under the cover of darkness, catching Pakistani defenders off guard.

A major waterway and a vital crossing point
Kumarkhali is a subdistrict located in Kushtia district in southwestern Bangladesh’s Khulna division. It’s situated along the Madhumati, a major waterway that posed a natural barrier to advancing troops.

Controlling Kumarkhali and its ferry provided a vital crossing point for supply lines and blocked Pakistani reinforcements or retreats. The area saw earlier skirmishes between local Mukti Bahini freedom fighters and Pakistani forces at sites like Ghaskhal, Dansha Chashi Club, and the Kumarkhali police station.

‘Unparalleled decisive brave action’
The operation was executed by the Indian Army’s 62 Mountain Brigade, which included the 5th Battalion of Maratha Light Infantry, 4th Battalion of the Sikh Light Infantry, and 2/9 Gorkha Rifles. Another brigade, the 7 Mountain Brigade, was also involved in the operation from the north of the river. Supporting armour came from the A Squadron of the 45 Cavalry Regiment, equipped with the Soviet-origin PT-76 amphibious light tanks.

A Squadron 45 Cavalry was commanded by Major (later Major General) P K Batra. According to Dinesh Kapila, son of Maj Gen Rajendra Nath, who has written in detail on this battle in Vayu magazine, it was an “unparalleled decisive brave action” undertaken during the war and deserved much more recognition by way of gallantry awards.

According to Major General Batra, prior to the actual crossing of Madhumati on December 14/15, 1971, the day was spent in planning. According to him, it was a rather choppy Madhumati river, which was 500-700 yards wide, with a water current of over four knots, and the other bank of the river was held by the Pakistan Army.

Around December 12, Major Batra’s squadron, less two troops, were placed under the command of the 62 Mountain Brigade and ordered to move to the Madhumati, where the Maratha Light Infantry was holding the western bank of the river. They covered approximately 100 km in about eight hours or so. The eastern bank of the Madhumati was held by two battalions of the Pakistan Army (not in full strength), with elements of a recce and support battalion and artillery.

The crossing was to take place at midnight. It was a tough decision. Failure would have put the brigade  back by 48 hours or more. Brigadier Rajendra Nath decided to bite the bullet. The onus now fell on Major Batra,  the squadron commander who chose to lead from the front and sat on the driver’s seat of the leading tank, and the brigade commander himself, who sat on the deck of the tank.

Upon reaching Kumarkhali, the combined tank-infantry attacking force overran Pakistani positions. The general officer commanding (GOC) of the Pakistan 9 Infantry Division, when informed of the tanks having crossed the Madhumati river, refused to believe and called it rubbish and actually stated that the troops who reported it were scared and making up stories.

He sent an officer to Kamarkhali, where the action was to confirm the information. The officer returned and informed the GOC that the tanks had crossed and were supporting the attacks on the Pakistani troops.
The town and ferry were secured with minimal Indian casualties. Pakistani losses included around 393 prisoners of war and equipment. This victory disrupted the Pakistan Army’s logistics in the Jessore-Kushtia sector and accelerated the collapse of its eastern command.

“Personally, for me, it was a great challenge as there was to be no failure. The success of the whole operation depended on the tanks getting across and supporting the attacks by the infantry,” recalls Major General Batra.