Military Digest | Haze on Kargil lapses, skewed view on intrusions persist

Brigadier Devinder Singh (Retd), who commanded the 70 Infantry Brigade in the Batalik sector; Brigadier MPS Bajwa (Retd), who led the 192 Mountain Brigade during the Battle for Tiger Hill; and Brigadier Surinder Singh (Retd), a former commander of the 121 Independent Infantry Brigade, responsible for the Kargil sector when the intrusions began, have spoken in interviews and lectures about what they describe as incomplete official accounts.

Brigadier Devinder Singh, whose formation at one stage controlled an unusually large force of 11 battalions, noted a continuing mismatch in how the conflict is remembered. After visiting the Kargil War Memorial at Dras and sites in Batalik on numerous remembrance days, he observed that the Dras memorial effectively functions as an 8 Mountain Division memorial, with insufficient distinct recognition of 70 Infantry Brigade’s operations.

In Batalik, now under the 192 Mountain Brigade, he found the sector’s wartime history dominated by Tiger Hill references, with 70 Brigade barely mentioned. At the Leh memorial, under 14 Corps, representation of Batalik and 70 Brigade has been reduced to a memento under a staircase—unlike earlier periods under the 3 Infantry Division. He attributed this to a post-war narrative portraying the 3 Infantry Division as having failed by allowing intrusions, while crediting the 8 Division (which arrived later) with the eviction, overlooking the fact that the 70 Brigade came from outside with the 8 Division.

‘Chilling effect’ of Indian artillery fire killing 43 Pakistani soldiers

Brig Devinder links heavy casualties inflicted on Pakistani Frontier Force battalions to Islamabad’s eventual decision to de-escalate. By July 5, 1999, Batalik had been cleared, and Indian troops were on the Line of Control by July 9—ahead of full clearances in Dras. Pakistan then rushed the 33rd and 4th Frontier Force battalions (Punjabi units from the 111th Brigade) into the sector. Indian artillery fire killed nearly 43 soldiers of the 33rd Frontier Force battalion. Brig Devinder Singh argued these losses, unlike those among Northern Light Infantry troops from Pakistan’s northern areas, had a chilling effect and, combined with diplomatic pressure from the United States, contributed to General Pervez Musharraf’s decision to pull back.

He also stressed that the dominant public narrative remains fixed at the tactical (battalion) level and the political-strategic plane (non-escalation, nuclear management), while “operational art”—the domain of generalship at division, corps, command, and Military Operations Directorate levels—receives almost no scrutiny. “This is the first war where the juniors have been victimised and seniors have been rewarded. That imbalance has not been challenged even today,” he said in an earlier interview. Unanswered questions, he maintained, continue to hang fire.

No information about Pakistani troop movements

Brigadier M P S Bajwa, decorated for leadership in the Tiger Hill operations, has earlier described a complete intelligence failure at the national level in Kargil. He raised questions on how no advance information reached the Army headquarters about Pakistani troop movements and the aircraft meant to gather intelligence over Kargil that had been diverted elsewhere. Initial intrusion reports came from local Bakerwals who noticed people on the heights. Bajwa recounted the challenge of capturing Tiger Hill with limited forces and the international attention it drew after then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee publicly announced the success, prompting a sharp Pakistani reaction.

He credited the Border Roads Organisation with opening the Zoji La Pass earlier than expected in May 1999, enabling reinforcements despite Pakistan’s calculation that snow would keep the route closed until June.

Eight lessons from Kargil

Bajwa listed eight key lessons from Kargil: intelligence failure, operational preparedness, surprise and deception, air support, innovative use of artillery, utilisation of resources within the battle, and the decisive role of junior leadership. He noted Pakistan’s advantages in counter-bombardment (aided by US gun-locating radars) and the difficulties India faced in evacuating casualties from high altitudes, while praising the Northern Light Infantry’s mountain warfare skills on the other side.

Brigadier Surinder Singh, the only senior officer against whom formal action was taken—he was removed from command and later terminated from service—has long maintained that the intrusions followed a pattern he had repeatedly flagged in writing. Commanding a 227-km frontage with eight or nine battalions (including BSF), he said he submitted detailed reports, sand-model briefings and war-gaming assessments as early as August–September 1998, identifying possible ingress routes, including the feature later known as Tiger Hill, and seeking mines, defence stores and occupation of key posts. These were refused.

‘Nation let down by failures higher up’

He recalled in an interview to this report that on being told that posts in Mushkoh and Batalik had traditionally been vacated for months each year, his requests to retain or re-occupy them were turned down. He also pointed to the removal of bridge guards from Chorbat La to Leh on higher orders from the headquarters 3 Infantry Division shortly before the conflict, the mothballing of tanks and diversion of strike-corps units to infantry tasks without their equipment, and multiple changes of key appointments (DGMO, Army commanders, company commanders, Brigade Major) in the months and weeks preceding and during the fighting.

Brig Surinder Singh has challenged the allegations that led to his dismissal—including the claims of improper handling of classified documents, vacation of Bajrang post, and failure to relocate an ammunition dump—through the courts. He asserts that RTI replies show no proper inquiry was held before his termination, that the one-man inquiry by Lt Gen A R K Reddy lacked legal sanctity under Army rules.

He contends that he had in fact recommended against further ammunition consignments to a vulnerable dump in Kargil, later blown up by Pakistani artillery firing, while higher headquarters continued to send stocks. He has argued that Pakistan prepared for years by raising and deploying Northern Light Infantry units—a development known to the Military Operations directorate and Military Intelligence—and that the nation was let down by failures higher up the chain. His case remains pending before the Armed Forces Tribunal.

Taken together, the accounts of the three officers over recent years underscore several enduring questions that official commemorations have not fully addressed. Why were written warnings and assessments from the ground disregarded? What was the precise nature and depth of the national-level intelligence failure? Has any analysis been done on the decision-making at division, corps, and Army headquarters levels, both before and during the conflict?

While the courage and performance of the battalions and junior leaders are universally acknowledged as decisive, the veterans insist that a fuller examination of operational-level generalship and the circumstances that allowed the intrusions remains necessary for institutional learning.