How a 93-year-old Sangrur farmer defeated a cement giant and Punjab Govt in Supreme Court

The petitioners, led by Sekhon and co-appellants from nearby villages, highlighted the site’s location in a designated rural agricultural zone under the Sangrur Master Plan, its proximity to farmlands, residential habitations, and Vasant Valley Public School, and the severe risks of particulate dust pollution to public health, particularly children.

The petitioners were represented by Senior Advocates Mukul Rohatgi and Parthiv Goswami.

The court emphasised that cement grinding units involve extensive handling of powdered material, leading to fugitive dust and health hazards that cannot be mitigated by assuming future compliance.

The 65-page judgment, structured in two parts, examined violations of the Punjab Regional and Town Planning and Development Act, 1995 (PRTPD Act), the binding nature of the Master Plan, siting norms under the Punjab Pollution Control Board’s 1998 notification, and broader constitutional principles under Articles 14 and 21, including the precautionary principle and the right to a clean environment.

The court clarified that its directions do not permanently bar industrial development but require authorities to follow transparent, statutory processes afresh if proposed. All approvals, based on the quashed CLU or relaxed norms, are withdrawn, marking a significant setback for the project amid prolonged local opposition.

Here are the key reasons cited by the Supreme Court for ruling against the Punjab Government, Shree Cement, and central regulatory bodies:

• The CLU dated December 13, 2021, was unlawful from the beginning as the site was in a rural agricultural zone under the operative Sangrur Master Plan; Red-category industries were impermissible without formal alteration of the Plan through mandatory public consultation, objection consideration, and gazette notification under Sections 70 and 75 of the PRTPD Act.

• The ex post facto “approval” in the Punjab Regional and Town Planning Board’s 43rd meeting (January 5, 2022) could not retrospectively cure the jurisdictional defect; the PRTPD Act does not permit internal minutes or administrative endorsements to substitute statutory amendment procedures under Section 76.

• Siting norms under the PPCB’s September 2, 1998, notification (requiring minimum distances from schools and residential clusters) and prior environmental clearance requirements under the EIA Notification, 2006, were not demonstrably complied with; measurements relied on assumptions rather than verified emission sources, and safeguards cannot be deferred to later stages.

• Conditions in consents or proposed mitigations (e.g., bag filters) cannot override threshold statutory prohibitions or supply jurisdiction where land use is impermissible; financial investments pursuant to illegal permissions confer no legitimacy.

The apex court gave the following reasons for quashing the 2025 reclassification of land and attendant notifications

• CPCB’s January 2025 reclassification of standalone grinding units without captive power plants from “Red” to “Orange” was arbitrary and unsustainable; it relied on generic sectoral assumptions rather than site-specific evidence that pollution risks (especially particulate emissions) had materially reduced to justify diluting preventive safeguards.

• Consequential relaxation of siting distances and regulatory oversight under MoEF&CC notifications infringed Articles 14 (arbitrariness) and 21 (right to clean environment); downgrades weakening protections must have rational, proportionate, and scientifically substantiated justification, absent here.

• The precautionary principle and sustainable development doctrine mandate erring on the side of protection where foreseeable health risks exist; regulatory frameworks cannot prioritise facilitation over non-derogable obligations to safeguard life, particularly for sensitive receptors like schools and habitations.

• While expert bodies deserve deference in technical classifications, judicial intervention is warranted where actions erode constitutional minima; environmental harm is often irreversible, requiring preventive rather than reactive regulation.

The court imposed no costs and disposed of all pending applications.