Military Digest | ‘Old soldiers never die’: 75 years of Truman sacking General Douglas MacArthur dramatically

In the message sent to MacArthur at his headquarters in Tokyo by Truman from Washington, he wrote, “I deeply regret that it becomes my duty as President and Commander in Chief of the United States military forces to replace you as Supreme Commander, Allied Powers; Commander in Chief, United Nations Command; Commander in Chief, Far East; and Commanding General, U.S. Army, Far East.

You will turn over your commands, effective at once, to Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway. You are authorized to have issued such orders as are necessary to complete desired travel to such place as you select.

My reasons for your replacement will be made public concurrently with the delivery to you of the foregoing order, and are contained in the next following message”.

The US President also made a public announcement on the dismissal of one of his senior-most generals holding the rank of General of the Army, equivalent to Field Marshal in the Indian Army.

“With deep regret I have concluded that General of the Army Douglas MacArthur is unable to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Government and of the United Nations in matters pertaining to his official duties. In view of the specific responsibilities imposed upon me by the Constitution of the United States and the added responsibility which has been entrusted to me by the United Nations, I have decided that I must make a change of command in the Far East. I have, therefore, relieved General MacArthur of his commands and have designated Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway as his successor,” he announced.

The Korean War

The Korean War began when the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) crossed the 38th parallel into South Korea. President Truman selected General Douglas MacArthur to lead the US troops in South Korea. MacArthur arrived at his post as a World War II hero, having successfully led multiple troops through the war. The Truman Library notes that following his victories in World War II, he became the supreme commander for the Allied Powers in Japan.

“MacArthur was revered and highly praised in the United States. The general assured the president that the Korean War would be short-lived and that the American troops would be home by Christmas,” it notes.

MacArthur was initially successful in driving back the North Korean forces over the 38th parallel. He made a controversial move, however, when he continued to push the North Koreans further north and suggested bombing cities in China that were thought to be aiding the North Korean troops.

“In pushing for a larger conflict, MacArthur downplayed the risk of inciting a massive war in Asia. President Truman’s main concern was saving as many lives as possible, even if that meant signing a ceasefire along the 38th parallel. General MacArthur did not think a ceasefire was an appropriate solution. The two men clashed,” the Truman Library says.

It adds that for Truman, the war represented an opportunity to stop the spread of communism into South Korea. For MacArthur, the war was an opportunity to liberate the North from communist control, and aggressive action was required.

“MacArthur thwarted Truman’s attempt to negotiate a ceasefire when the general ordered his troops to invade North Korea and push the NKPA up past the 38th parallel. This was not the first time the general had ignored direct orders from his Commander in Chief. On April 11, 1951, President Truman officially relieved Douglas MacArthur of his command,” it says.

Criticism of General MacArthur

The then chairman joint chiefs of staff, General Omar Bradley, a five-star general himself in the rank of General of the Army, famously said that MacArthur’s policies “would involve us in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy”.

James M Lindsay, Council on Foreign Relations’ senior vice president and director of studies, argues that the firing of MacArthur shows that “presidents can be justified in overruling the military advice of even their most decorated generals”. That lesson continues to apply today, he says.

During the period between April 6 and 9, 1951, a number of meetings were held in the White House on the question of General MacArthur’s dismissal, but no contemporary records of them have been found. The US State Archives note that on April 6, Truman met with his most senior advisors, including the secretary of state and Gen Bradley and on the next day, he met the same group and made his formal request that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be polled.

On April 8, General Bradley and the service chiefs met and agreed on the need to dismiss MacArthur, after which they conveyed their decision to Secretary Goeroge C Marshall, a former General of the Army himself. On the following day, the President received the unanimous recommendation for dismissal and decided to proceed on this course, the US archives note.

“President Truman signed the appropriate orders on April 10, with plans calling for the formal notification to MacArthur to be conveyed personally by Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, then in Korea, who would proceed to MacArthur’s headquarters for the purpose. This was scheduled to take place at 10 a. m. on April 12 in Tokyo (8 p. m., April 11, in Washington), but the threat of a premature news leak late on April 10 along with a delay in transmission of the message to Pace due to mechanical difficulties moved the President to make public the dismissal notice, effective immediately, at approximately 1 a.m. on April 11 in Washington to coincide with the arrival in Tokyo in mid-afternoon of a communication from the Department of Defense concerning the action,” the archives say.

Incompetence of command in Korea

Lawrence Freedman, in his book ‘Command: The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine’, attributes McArthur’s sacking to another factor apart from his dismissive approach to orders from Washington. He says that the failure of McArthur to correctly prosecute the offensive against the Chinese at the end of 1950, which resulted in a severe setback to UN forces at the hands of the Chinese, was another factor.

“Four days after he launched the ‘end-the-war’ offensive, the counter blow from the Chinese caught the Americans completely by surprise and inflicted heavy losses. The 2nd Infantry Division were mauled after walking into an ambush, while the 1st Marine Division struggled to escape after being surrounded at the Changjin Reservoir. Within a couple of weeks, the Eighth reading story, it is not meant for Monday. Army was back behind the 38th Parallel preparing to defend Seoul, while X Corps was being pushed into a situation that could make evacuation unavoidable,” he writes.

Freedman also quotes a member of General Omar Bradley’s staff as saying, What really counted was that Mac Arthur had lost confidence in himself and was beginning to lose the confidence of his field officers and troops. There is nothing in the book that more seriously undermines a commander’s effectiveness than this”.

After dismissal, MacArthur retired

The general accepted his marching orders stoically and returned to the US to a hero’s welcome. In his farewell address to the US Congress on April 19, he defended his role in Korea, emphasised the rising Chinese threat and the lack of appreciation of it by the leadership in Washington. However, it was the end of his speech which is most recalled in history.

Addressing the Congressmen in the presence of President Truman, Gen Mac Arthur said, “The world has turned over many times since I took the oath on the plain at West Point and the hopes and dreams have long since vanished, but I still remember the refrain of one of the most popular barrack ballads of that day which proclaimed most proudly that “old soldiers never die; they just fade away”. And like the old soldier of that ballad, I now close my military career and just fade away, an old soldier who tried to do his duty as God gave him the light to see that duty. Good Bye”.