Monroe Doctrine was not about American dominance: Anne Applebaum on Trump and Venezuela

Q: What does the US intervention in Venezuela suggest about how power is being exercised in the current global order?

Anne Applebaum:  What you see now is Donald Trump following a pattern that has been established by other dictatorships. When Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine in 2022, he did so on the grounds that Ukraine is Russian territory and he can do whatever he wants there. You now have similar language coming from the President of the United States—that he can do what he wants in Venezuela because it’s in the Western Hemisphere.

I should say that not everybody in the Trump administration talks like that. There is some legal case for the removal of (Nicolás) Maduro, and there could even have been a moral case. Maduro was a very damaging leader. He was part of the Chavista regime that destroyed the country. It would have been possible to create a regional alliance for change in Venezuela, but that’s not how Trump chose to do it. And I think that will have negative repercussions.

In 2013, John Kerry said the Monroe Doctrine was no longer relevant. With recent U S actions, some argue it has returned in a new form. How do you see the consequences of this shift, and do you think it will be limited to Venezuela or Latin America?

To be clear, there is no Monroe Treaty. There is something called the Monroe Doctrine, which dates from the first part of the nineteenth century. The Monroe Doctrine was a statement that there should be no European imperial powers in the Western Hemisphere. In other words, it was a statement that the US would work against French, Spanish, and British incursions into the region. It was not a statement of American imperial dominance, and it never was.

The phrase has been used and misused over many years, but the way Trump is using it is not how it was originally conceived. It’s very hard to say right now what it will mean, because US policy toward Latin America over the last 30 or 40 years has mostly been an attempt to create good trade relations, sometimes to push back against terrorist movements or drug gangs, but it has recognised the sovereignty of Latin American states. Whether that continues remains to be seen.

One thing I think will happen is that once the US openly defines itself as a regional bully and nothing else, many Latin American countries will begin to organise against the United States. You will see other countries begin to change their politics because of that.

It’s important to remember that Venezuela was a disaster. Maduro was a bad leader. I have many friends in the Venezuelan opposition and I was very sympathetic to them. They wanted Maduro removed. What disturbs me is the language being used and the way Trump talks about running Venezuela as if he were running it, which obviously he is not.

With the United States acting more unilaterally, how do you assess China’s rise as a global power in this evolving global landscape?

Anne Applebaum: If the US declares the Western Hemisphere to be its exclusive area, then you can imagine other powers doing the same. The Chinese might say they are in charge of Asia, which would not be very popular in India, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, or anywhere else. I don’t think anybody wants to be a Chinese colony.

It sets a bad precedent. What it will mean in practice remains to be seen, and whether the Chinese will act on it is unclear. Right now, almost ironically, China is using the language of international law and stability, claiming that’s what it stands for, although China is also a dictatorship that can make very whimsical decisions.

How likely is it that Iran’s internal crisis could spill over into a wider conflict, and what factors matter most in preventing that?

Anne Applebaum: What’s happening in Iran is almost the opposite of that fear. What you’re seeing is the Iranian people revolting against, among other things, the foreign policy of their regime. For several decades, the Iranian regime has tried to promote Islamic revolution around the Middle East and the world, using proxy forces such as Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and others, while developing a nuclear weapon and seeking to promote global jihadism.

What you’re seeing now is the Iranian people rejecting that disastrous foreign policy, the impoverishment and isolation of the country, and the repressiveness of the regime. What’s happening is extraordinary. Police are clearly shooting demonstrators, and yet the demonstrators are still coming.

As we are speaking now, at 9 o’clock in the morning on Monday (January 12, 2026) it is very hard to know what the result will be or even fully understand what’s happening inside Iran. But what you’re watching is a protest against Iran’s involvement in the Middle East and a demand that the regime focus on its own people. If there were to be some kind of regime change or shift in leadership, that could actually be stabilising for the Middle East, because it would end the export of revolution that has been Iran’s policy since 1979.

Q: Do you see a growing normalization of authoritarian practices globally. What factors are contributing to this – is it technology, is it economic anxiety?

Anne Applebaum: Yes. My view is that there are two related factors. Much of it has to do with technology and the way we now communicate with each other. Social media has become our main form of communication, and it promotes the most divisive and angry opinions while suppressing better conversation and more rational views. It boosts conspiracy theories rather than analysis.

It’s not a coincidence that you see similar phenomena all over the world. Countries that have very little in common—Poland, the United States, India, the Philippines—shouldn’t share political pathologies, and yet they do. That’s because they are connected through social media.

Another part of the story is the enormous inequality that has opened up. A small number of people have become billionaires thanks to the tech revolution, while many others feel left behind. That creates dissatisfaction, anger, and a sense of injustice. This is true in autocratic states as well as democracies. The destabilisation we see is everywhere. The underlying factors are tied to technological change.

Q: Many observers say international relations are becoming more transactional. What do you think is driving this?

Anne Applebaum: There has always been some degree of transactionalism. Countries have always competed. That isn’t new. What I think we’re really seeing, though, isn’t transactionalism so much as corruption.

In many countries, across the political spectrum—from Russia to the United States to China—you see leaders combining political and economic power, using political office to make money for themselves while disregarding the impact on their societies. The traditional purpose of government was to improve life for people, to create a peaceful state and a prosperous polity. Now, for many politicians, the point of being in government is personal or familial enrichment.

That was always present, but the scale is different. Technology, secrecy, and new financial tools have made it easier to hide wealth. Cryptocurrency has enabled new ways of transferring and investing money in secret. That is the real change.

Autocracy, Inc.: The Dictators Who Want to Run the World is a 2024 non-fiction book written by Pulitzer Prize winner Anne Applebaum and published by Doubleday. (Source: Penguin Random House)

In Autocracy Inc., you argue that autocrats are united not by ideology but by interests. Has that view grown stronger?

My views haven’t changed. Some events since I wrote the book have added nuance, but the core idea remains: there is a network of autocratic states that work together based on shared interests, not ideology. The links between Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and previously Venezuela are still there, as are connections in Russian-dominated parts of Africa. Some of these countries have ideologies—Iran has an ideology of Islamic revolution, China has its own ideological framework—but that hasn’t stopped them from working together. What matters is common interests and common business deals.

How do you see the fate of the ‘Davos man’—the global elite committed to cooperation and openness?

Anne Applebaum: The era when we believed global cooperation would solve most problems, and when that belief sat at the centre of foreign policy, did have naïve elements. But we are going to be very sad when it is gone. What is replacing it is bitter competition for resources and attempts by larger countries to crush smaller ones.

It will be an uglier world. I don’t know if it will be a world war, but it will be a place with more violence. It’s not a good transition.

How far do you see the present trend of nativism and hypernationalism replacing globalisation? And do you, like rightwing historians like Niall Ferguson, see the threat of a third world war?

Anne Applebaum: Yes, although I would modify that, because in some ways we are already in a kind of world war. The Russian invasion of Ukraine represented a level of brutality and violence, combined with technology, that was unprecedented in Europe since the Second World War.

You now see Russia using hybrid warfare to undermine Europe and the United States, manipulating political systems and elections. There is a global competition that is sometimes violent and sometimes nonviolent, but it increasingly feels like a world war.

Instead of countries seeking mutually beneficial solutions, there is a growing belief in a zero-sum game—competition over minerals, oil, and power. I don’t know if ‘world war’ is the right term, but the scale of competition is certainly new.

Applebaum, who was in London at the time of the interview, will soon be in India for The Jaipur Literature Festival.