It is not about size, scope or ideology. Rather, it is about getting things done.
Indian scholarship is doubly bereaved, for it has lost a fine teacher and a good man.
Bipan Chandra’s life celebrated the virtues of revisionism.
Chandra was a passionate historian, but he never let political affiliation get in the way of personal and professional ties.
Can al-Sisi succeed where Mubarak and Morsi have failed?
The Arab state is therefore often violent because it is weak.” This line from Over-Stating the Arab State by the Egyptian scholar Nazih Ayubi perfectly illustrates the situation in Egypt today. Recently, an Egyptian court sentenced 529 Muslim Brotherhood supporters to death for the killing of one police officer. It came as a shock to many Egyptians, including those who had protested against the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood in June 2013. The decision shows the weakness of state institutions, manifested in random violence. Since the ousting of Mohammed Morsi in July 2013, the interim authority has failed to offer an alternative political path for Egypt’s transition, and has returned to using coercive measures to silence its opponents.
This violently weak state is a threat to any new political regime. It has turned a large part of Egyptian society against its two former presidents, Hosni Mubarak and Morsi. Massive popular mobilisations, followed by military intervention, forced both to leave office before finishing their term. The deterioration in the state’s ability to provide basic services to Egyptian society, whether it was health, education or transportation, undermined the legitimacy of the Mubarak regime in its last years. When this deterioration also reached the security sector, it contributed to the fall of the regime. The death of 28-year-old Khaled Said in June 2010, who was arrested and beaten by the police, sparked a wave of anger among the youth. They took to the streets six months later to bring down the Mubarak regime.
The incident underlined the randomness of the security forces, which had moved away from repressing opposition to the regime to killing innocent people. Said was no threat to the Mubarak regime, but his killing sent a message to the youth that being apolitical is not enough to save your life. This was a motivating factor behind the demonstrations of January 2011.
When Morsi came to power in June 2012, he expressed his intention to reform state institutions, including the security sector. However, instead of reforming them, he tried to control them by appointing members of the Muslim Brotherhood to key positions. The resistance of the state bureaucracy prevented him from gaining full control over these institutions, and his failure to ameliorate state services turned a large part of his constituency against him. While the Muslim Brotherhood accused the “deep state” of conspiring against the president, what Morsi faced was not a deep but a weak state, the same weak state that brought down the Mubarak regime. Certain state institutions were unhappy with the Muslim Brotherhood in power. Other state institutions were simply unable to deliver basic services, exactly as it had transpired under the Mubarak regime.
Thus, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s stress on reforming state institutions, in the speech declaring his candidacy continued…