Opinion Lose some, win more

This year could easily be described as the year of the ideological offensive by the BJP. Only by doing so can we make sense of the various disparate developments and understand the implicit link between the maverick extremist fringe and apparently sober elements of Hindutva. Four seemingly unconnected developments during the outgoing year represent the offensive.

The year was dominated by the cow and beef issue. This closely followed the emphasis on yoga and occasional demands to promote the Gita. From Gita to gaumata, each scripted a new set of cultural mores. Each one was marshalled to raise the Hindu consciousness with all the ambiguities involved in the complex network of religion and civilisation. It is not that the BJP and Hindutva organisations have discovered the cow only now, but that at the current juncture, we witness an effort to popularise new cultural mores, make them dominant through these symbols and markers. At one end, there is intimidation against the consumption of beef; at another, there is a shaping of the new culture that determines and dictates what to eat or wear, what and how to celebrate, and so on. Thus, for the so-called fringe, the debate was literally about cow and beef. But read carefully, and it was more about our cultural being as Indians.

This cultural offensive was closely accompanied by the war over icons, history and memory. In his first year in power, Modi sought to appropriate Gandhi. But as I had argued in these columns (‘Cleansing Gandhi of radicalism’, October 7, 2014) that was an effort to strip Gandhi of ideas and interpretations inconvenient to the project of Congress-mukt (read, Hindutva-based) Bharat. Astute politician that he is, Modi would not miss the opportunity of similarly appropriating Ambedkar. This year thus witnessed a renewed effort to fully situate Ambedkar into the Hindutva way of thinking. As any hegemonic project would do, not just Gandhi and Ambedkar, but almost every historical figure seems appropriated — Bose being the latest example. These efforts at ideological remix aim at reconstructing social imagery and committing public imagination to the Hindutva way of thinking.

Another less commented on — and indeed unconnected — issue is about the constitutional framework. It is ironic that the celebrations of Ambedkar as the maker of the Constitution took place alongside small but significant attempts to undermine it. This happened on two different fronts. During the special session of Parliament, the home minister raised the issue of the illegitimacy of the term “secular” state. It is surprising but instructive that that comment did not produce any substantive debate. Separately, we now have at least three states where local electoral frameworks transgress constitutional morality. It is not a coincidence that these are all BJP-ruled states where restrictions on contesting local elections, or the compulsion to vote, are emerging as the new mechanisms to undercut democratic logic. But public discussion has focused more on the disappointment with judicial approval than with the legislative decisions in the first place.

Finally, 2015 also saw public protests by intellectuals and artistes against various excesses. These protests constituted an inchoate response to both cultural interventions and the culture of violence and intimidation. Those who joined in these protests must have been subconsciously aware of the significance of the developments they were protesting against — it was not just some isolated event or knee-jerk response. And yet, the protests failed to identify the root of the problem — the agenda of building a new hegemony. As a result, the protests remained confined to details and countering propaganda in a formal and positivist manner. They failed to generate public curiosity about, and support for, the fundamental concerns.

But there was something else that was most interesting about the “intolerance debate” and the overall politics of ideas. This constituted the ideological counter-offensive. Perhaps for the first time, instead of going on the defensive, the BJP and its sympathisers engaged with the “protesters” in a variety of ways. The protesters were accused of being pro-Congress and politically motivated; the usual questions were raised about their stand on Kashmiri Pandits and the anti-Sikh violence; the timing of the protests was linked to the Bihar elections; imitating Chomskyan vocabulary, the protests were branded as a “manufactured rebellion”. Notably, fundamental issues were deflected by naming it as the “anti-tolerance” protests. Thus, the debate was framed and identified not by those who initiated it but by those arguing on behalf of, or in favour of, the ruling establishment.

What is of significance is that in consonance with its hegemonic ambitions, the BJP and its larger Hindutva universe was ready to intellectually join the debate. That itself should be indication enough of the change brought about during this year — notwithstanding its electoral setback, the BJP appeared poised for the politics of ideas. One more, and crucial, step in the direction of shaping a new hegemony.